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Summary of recommendations
Good governance
Getting the institutional framework right for a low carbon economy
The policy landscape for energy is complex, with a responsibility for energy and environment policy split 
between two Secretaries of State. There is also a lack of alignment between Ofgem’s goals and government’s 
goals and there is no regulatory framework for the provision of heat. Ofgem’s institutional culture and approach 
do not reflect the imperative of sustainable development, particularly climate change. 
The SDC recommends that:
•	 Energy	and	environment	policy	is	brought	together	under	one	Secretary	of	State
•	 A	regulatory	framework	for	the	provision	of	heat	is	established	
•	 Ofgem’s	primary	duty	is	changed	to	align	Ofgem’s	goals	with	the	goals	of	 
government energy and environment policy 
•	 An	interpretation	document	is	published	to	set	out	how	the	new	duty	will	be	 
interpreted and the factors that constitute the consumer interest
•	 The	existing	social	and	environmental	guidance	to	Ofgem	is	clarified
•	 Ofgem’s	guidance	on	regulatory	impact	assessments	is	updated:
 –  to ensure that an appropriate social cost of carbon is used consistently
 –  to be explicit about the assessment of environmental impacts
•	 Ofgem	undertakes	a	capability-building	programme	for	its	staff	on	 
sustainable development.
Environmental limits
How is Ofgem addressing the environmental impacts of the UK energy system?
Combined heat and power and renewable generators face a number of barriers to participating in the energy 
markets and connecting to the transmission and distribution grids. The UK’s ageing electricity distribution 
networks need strengthening to cope with increased levels of distributed generation.
The SDC recommends that:
•	 A	greenhouse	gas	incentive	package	is	used	in	the	Price	Control	Reviews.	 
For	the	distribution	Price	Control	Review,	this	would	include:
 –  strengthening of the distribution losses incentive
 –  revision of the distributed generation incentive and support to improve the  
ability	of	the	distribution	networks	to	handle	two-way	power	flows
 –  increasing the Innovation Funding Incentive
	 –	 	widening	the	scope	of	Registered	Power	Zones	and	support	for	the	deployment	 
of innovative technologies
•	 A	‘connect	then	manage’	approach	is	adopted	to	help	connection	of	new	generation	to	
the transmission network
•	 Government	and	Ofgem	review	the	transmission	charging	arrangements	for	combined	
heat and power or provide further support for combined heat and power
•	 Ofgem	ensures	that	any	proposals	to	change	transmission	charges	do	not	disadvantage	
generators connected to the distribution network
•	 Ofgem	ensures	that	the	network	charging	arrangements,	and	the	process	for	reviewing	
these	charges,	fully	reflect	the	interests	of	smaller	generators
•	 Ofgem	works	with	National	Grid	to	develop	a	web-based	tool	that	allows	generators	to	
understand the costs of connecting to the networks
•	 Sustainable	development	is	included	as	an	objective	in	the	industry	codes	and	Ofgem	
supports	the	industry	in	developing	modifications	to	reflect	the	change
•	 The	code	modification	process	is	simplified	so	that	the	interests	of	smaller	participants	
are fully represented.
Strong society and sustainable economy
How is Ofgem addressing social concerns?
Consumers need to receive accurate and informative bills in order to engage with their energy use but the 
existing approach to metering and billing prevents this. Reductions in energy prices have helped to alleviate 
fuel poverty but this has been partially reversed by recent price rises. There needs to be a greater focus on 
managing energy use through better information and energy efficiency measures.
The SDC recommends that:
•	 Ofgem	responds	rapidly	once	the	billing	and	metering	trials	are	complete	to	improve	the	
accuracy	of	bills	and	facilitate	a	roll-out	of	smart	meters
•	 Ofgem	mandates	that	pre-payment	meters	are	smart	meters	capable	of	two-way	
communication to give consumers a better understanding of their energy use
•	 Greater	focus	is	placed	on	a	wider	range	of	payment	options,	including	using	post-office	
deductions and fuel direct services as a means of paying outstanding fuel bills
•	 Ofgem	requires	energy	companies	to	provide	tariffs	for	pre-payment	meter	customers	
that are not excessive compared to direct debit and standard credit tariffs
•	 Ofgem	ensures	that	wholesale	price	reductions	are	passed	on	to	all	customers,	especially	
low income and vulnerable customers.
This review examines Ofgem’s performance, as the 
regulator of the gas and electricity markets, against 
its sustainable development duty. We also consider 
Ofgem’s duties and powers, its interpretation of 
these duties, and how these could be changed in 
the future. We have examined the current barriers 
to a more sustainable energy system, and we 
present a series of recommendations, and some 
ideas for further development, on ways in which 
those barriers could be overcome. 
Review	Methodology
This Review has been carried out through:
• A series of interviews with experts in the 
energy field, including energy suppliers 
generators, network companies, industry 
commentators, NGOs and academics
• Consultation with an Expert Advisory Group 
from industry, academia and government
• Interviews with Ofgem staff, managing 
directors and the Sustainable Development 
Sub-committee of the Ofgem Authority
• Desk-based research into the options for 
change to the energy system1
• Desk-based research into international 
comparisons of energy markets in Denmark, 
California and the Netherlands2
• Desk-based research into consumer attitudes 
to energy.3
Structure	of	this	Report
In this project we have assessed Ofgem’s performance 
against the Government’s five sustainable 
development principles, with particular emphasis 
on ‘living within environmental limits’, achieving a 
‘strong, healthy and just society’, ‘good governance’ 
and ‘achieving a sustainable economy’.4 
Our findings and recommendations cover
• Longer term, strategic issues about the extent 
to which the UK energy system, including 
Ofgem’s role, are fit for purpose given the 
new context of the Stern Review and the 
Climate Change Bill
• Shorter term, practical issues that can be 
implemented soon. These include institutional 
issues within Ofgem, improvement of the 
conditions for low carbon energy generators, 
and better incentive structures for the 
network companies.
 
We note, however, that even the long term issues 
require key decisions to be taken soon if the nation 
is to have an electricity system that is fit for purpose 
for the 21st century.
Our Overall Assessment
Ofgem’s	role	so	far
Ofgem was created in the 1990s to ensure the 
efficient operation of the gas and electricity 
markets. In fulfilling this remit, it has operated as an 
extremely efficient regulator, facilitating improved 
competition between energy suppliers, and leading 
to consumer price reductions. However, during 
recent years there has been a dramatic change 
in the energy landscape, with a focus on climate 
change, energy security, and the need to accelerate 
the UK’s move to a low carbon economy becoming 
of crucial important. 
Ofgem’s remit has been refined as the challenges 
facing the energy system have changed. In 2000, 
it was given a duty to protect the environment and 
to have regard to the social and environmental 
guidance issued by the Secretary of State and in 
2004, it was given the duty to contribute to the 
achievement of sustainable development. 
These changes are welcome but have been 
piecemeal. The question now is whether Ofgem has 
1 Executive summary
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The Sustainable Development Commission (SDC) is the UK Government’s independent advisor on 
sustainable development, reporting to the Prime Minister and the First Ministers of Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland. This is our second thematic review and it assesses whether Ofgem could take a more 
proactive role in helping the UK to move to a low carbon energy system. 
kept pace with the climate change imperative and 
whether the government framework within which 
it operates is fit for the challenge of moving to a 
completely decarbonised electricity system by 2050. 
The fundamental issue is should Ofgem be making 
a	low-cost	system	as	sustainable	as	possible,	or	
should it be making a sustainable energy system 
at the lowest possible cost?
Ofgem has had successes in: 
• Driving down the price of energy
• Improving the efficiency of the formerly 
nationalised industries, to create more 
competitive energy companies
• Providing a stable business framework, in 
which the regulated industries can predict 
Ofgem’s approach, maintaining levels of 
investment in both networks and generation 
at a reasonable cost of capital
• Introducing some new measures since the 
introduction of its sustainable development 
duty in 2004, particularly in the 2005 
Distribution and 2007 Transmission Price 
Control Reviews. 
Ofgem influences the energy market, networks and 
consumers, but has a particularly direct influence 
on the networks, through its regulation of the 
transmission and distribution network operators in 
gas and electricity. Ofgem also created the electricity 
trading arrangements and the generator connection 
arrangements, which impact significantly on low 
carbon generating companies.
Existing constraints in the energy system
Given the increasing need for all parts of the UK 
economy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, 
there are notable difficulties in the Ofgem regulated 
energy sector, including:
In the energy markets:
• Intermittent and small-scale energy 
generation is penalised by the electricity 
trading arrangements
• New entrants are less able to influence 
changes in the market structure because 
the process for industry code modifications 
(i.e. the way changes are made to the 
rules governing the detailed market 
operation) tends to support the interests of 
the large, incumbent market participants. 
Smaller businesses, which are usually new 
entrants, do not have the staff to participate 
adequately in code modification discussions.
The energy networks: 
• Capacity constraints are delaying the 
connection of renewable generation. This is 
particularly acute in parts of northern England 
and Scotland, where the Beauly–Denny line 
has been awaiting planning permission 
for some time, and where decisions on 
undergrounding of transmission lines are 
particularly important as the lines would pass 
through designated landscapes
• Generators of remote, clean energy are 
penalised by the Connection and Use of 
System Charging arrangements, which weigh 
against generators located at points distant 
from the major sources of demand in the 
south east of England 
• There has been a serious under-investment in 
systems and technologies that facilitate the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions due 
to the dramatic fall in innovation spending by 
the network operators since privatisation
• Losses from the networks account for around 
7% of the total GB generating mix (equal to 
the entire generating output of Drax).
Ofgem has already recognised both the innovation 
and losses problems, and went some way to address 
these in the 2005 Distribution Price Control Review 
(DPCR) and in the 2007 Transmission Price Control 
Review (TPCR). However, our view is that much 
more needs to be done.
Engaging the consumer with the energy system:
• Consumers are unable to take full 
responsibility for their energy use because 
information on bills is difficult to understand, 
and there is little incentive beyond the 
energy efficiency measures offered 
through the Energy Efficiency Commitment. 
Levels of billing complaints remain high 
(around six times higher than the level of 
complaints in both water and fixed line 
telecommunications).
The availability of low carbon heat:
• The system as a whole is wasteful of heat 
because heat as a commodity is unregulated. 
The regulatory focus is on meeting demands 
for gas as a proxy for meeting heat demand. 
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The policy context has changed markedly since 
Ofgem was established. By 2050 it is likely that 
the UK electricity system will need to be almost 
completely decarbonised. Radical development of 
climate policy that establishes a price of carbon 
through tax, trading or regulation, as well as policies 
to promote innovation and consumer behaviour 
change, is urgently needed. 
 
But we perceive two elements of the current policy 
framework that undermine a strong approach to 
tackling climate change through energy policy. 
These are that:
• The carbon price is too low to drive change. 
There is over-reliance by government and 
Ofgem on the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
(EU ETS) to set a carbon price to drive the 
market towards low carbon generation. At 
present, this policy is not delivering emissions 
reduction, as the overall cap is not tight 
enough and so the market price has been too 
low to incentivise low carbon options. This 
policy cannot be relied upon to deliver our 
climate goals, and strengthening the EU ETS 
itself, while absolutely necessary, is a slow 
process as it requires negotiation with all EU 
Member States. 
• The business model for energy companies 
is still driven by the need to sell more units 
of energy, for example through increasing 
market share, rather than provide energy 
services that reduce consumption. Although 
the Energy Efficiency Commitment (EEC) 
has become a more central part of the 
supply companies’ business model, this 
fundamental conflict can only be tackled 
through a comprehensive policy reappraisal 
by government. 
The approach to energy supply and demand in 
California is an interesting model, although we 
recognise that it could not be comprehensively 
transferred to the UK within our current system. 
But it is worth exploring how the regulatory system 
could be transformed to enable energy companies 
to secure as good a return for shareholders from 
selling fewer units of energy as they do by selling 
more units. We hope that the development of 
the Supplier Obligation for 2011 will provide that 
opportunity.
Government policy introducing new banding of 
the Renewables Obligation to provide targeted 
support for renewable energy technologies, as well 
as the continued tightening of the EU ETS cap, will 
stimulate a stronger carbon price in the market. 
Both these measures are important for supporting 
a low carbon energy system. Regulatory measures 
to ensure easier access to the electricity grid for low 
carbon generation will also be critical. 
In view of the recently agreed EU target for 
renewables to contribute at least 20% of EU energy 
supply (with the UK share of this currently unclear), 
a much more proactive programme encouraging 
renewable energy generation and connection to the 
grid will be needed in the UK. The EU Renewables 
Directive 2001 also requires Member States to 
provide priority access for renewable generation, and 
our recommendations for near-term interventions 
are therefore central to ensuring compliance with 
our EU responsibilities. 
Given the overwhelming need for better alignment 
of the government’s energy goals through the 
delivery and regulatory bodies, the SDC believes that 
fundamental changes are needed. The opportunity 
to bring energy and environment policy together 
under one Secretary of State was rejected within 
the 2007 machinery of government changes. We 
recommend that this change be made at the next 
opportunity. 
We are also recommending a change to Ofgem’s 
primary duty (see below). We think that this is an 
essential short-term change which is needed to 
align Ofgem’s goals with government’s goals. In 
the longer term, we recommend that a regulatory 
framework is established for the provision of heat 
and that this could come within Ofgem’s remit. 
We are recommending this only if Ofgem’s duties 
are changed to strongly reflect the climate change 
imperative. 
Recommendations	–	Strategic	Issues
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The SDC has analysed the institutional arrangements 
in Ofgem to identify how effectively it carries out its 
sustainable development and other environmental 
and social duties. Our recommendations are given 
below. 
 
Change	Ofgem’s	primary	duty:
The SDC recommends that Ofgem’s primary duty 
be changed to reflect the compelling need to move 
to a decarbonised energy system. This report sets 
out three options for how this might be done. 
The most important driver for Ofgem has been the 
delivery of its primary duty (also referred to as its 
‘principal objective’). This has been interpreted as 
‘the affordability, availability, security and quality 
of gas and electricity supplies’. In practice, it is the 
affordability and availability of energy for present 
consumers that has been given the most weight to 
the detriment of the interests of future consumers.
We are therefore recommending a new primary duty 
for Ofgem to include the reduction of greenhouse 
gases. This would align Ofgem’s goals with the goals 
of government energy and environment policy. 
Box 1 sets out our options for wording in relation 
to Ofgem’s duties in relation to electricity. Similar 
wording would need to be developed for Ofgem’s 
duties in relation to gas and for any future duties in 
relation to heat. 
Recommendations	for	shorter-term	implementation
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Box 1  Options for change to Ofgem’s primary duty
Option A1
The principal objectives of the Secretary of State and the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority (in 
this Act referred to as ‘the Authority’) in carrying out their respective functions under this Part are 
as follows:
 a)  to	reduce	the	emission	of	greenhouse	gasses	in	accordance	with	[targets	notified	by	
the	Secretary	of	State	to	the	Authority/National	Policy	Statements	on	greenhouse	gas	
emissions reductions/Government targets for greenhouse gas emissions reductions].
	 b)		subject	to	such	measures	as	the	Authority	considers	appropriate	in	the	performance	
of	its	objectives	set	out	in	a)	above, to protect the interests of consumers in relation to 
electricity conveyed by distribution systems or transmission systems, wherever appropriate, 
by promoting effective competition between persons engaged in, or in commercial activities 
connected with, the generation transmission or supply of electricity or the provision or use of 
electricity interconnectors.
Option A2
The principal objectives of the Secretary of State and the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority (in 
this Act referred to as ‘the Authority’) in carrying out their respective functions under this Part are 
as follows:
 a)  to protect the interests of consumers in relation to electricity conveyed by distribution systems 
or transmission systems wherever appropriate, by promoting effective competition between 
persons engaged in, or in commercial activities connected with, the generation, transmission, 
distribution or supply of electricity or the provision or use of electricity interconnectors; and
	 b)		subject	to	such	measures	as	the	Authority	considers	appropriate	in	the	performance	
of	its	objectives	set	out	in	(a)	above,	to	reduce	the	emissions	of	greenhouse	gasses	in	
accordance	with	targets	notified	by	the	Secretary	of	State	to	the	Authority.
Option B
The principal objectives of the Secretary of State and the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority (in 
this Act referred to as ‘the Authority’) in carrying out their respective functions under this Part are 
to protect the interests of consumer in relation to electricity conveyed by distribution systems or 
transmission systems, wherever appropriate, by promoting effective competition between persons 
engaged in, or in commercial activities connected with, the generation, transmission, distribution 
or supply of electricity or the provision or use of electricity interconnectors, while reducing the 
emissions	 of	 greenhouse	 gasses	 in	 accordance	with	 [targets	 notified	 by	 the	 Secretary	 of	
State	to	the	Authority/	National	Policy	Statements	on	greenhouse	gas	emissions	reductions/
Government targets for greenhouse gas emissions reductions.
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Publish	an	interpretation	document
The change in primary duty should be supported 
by an Interpretation Document to set out for the 
energy generators, network operators and suppliers 
how Ofgem will interpret its new duties. Experience 
in the energy and other markets shows that it is the 
interpretation of a duty that is most important for 
participants. We recommend that the interpretation 
document sets out the factors that constitute the 
interests of present and future consumers, including 
allowing for defensive investments in low-carbon 
technologies.
Ofgem’s existing social and environmental guidance 
should also be revised as the existing wording 
severely limits Ofgem’s ability to implement social 
and environmental measures. We recommend that 
guidance is clarified and that it states what level of 
impact on bills is considered excessive. 
Reflect	the	social	cost	of	carbon	and	strengthen	
assessment of social impacts 
Ofgem has largely been using low values for the 
social cost of carbon in its cost benefit analysis. 
During the 2005 Distribution Price Control Review 
(PCR), a cost of £29/tonne of carbon (tC) appears to 
have been used, even though government was using 
a cost of £80/tC for its policy cost benefit analysis 
for the Climate Change Programme Review.
 
In all its cost benefit calculations, Ofgem should 
make consistent use of the price range for the 
social cost of carbon as set out in the Government 
Economic Service’s advice to Departments. This 
advice sets out a central value of £70/tC with a 
range for sensitivity analysis of £35 – 140/tC (in 
2000 prices). We welcome the recent change in 
approach to use the appropriate range, as in the 
2007 RIA on transmission losses charging, although 
we have seen no specific evidence that Ofgem has 
asked its economists to do this. 
We recommend that Ofgem’s guidance on impact 
assessments is updated, to ensure that an appropriate 
social cost of carbon is consistently used. 
On social impacts, the guidance gives an example 
of distributional impacts between rural and urban 
customers. However, it does not clearly articulate how 
the impact on different consumer groups should be 
assessed which makes it difficult for these impacts 
to be incorporated into policy development.
We recommend that Ofgem’s RIA guidance is 
updated to be explicit about assessment of social 
impacts. 
Embedding sustainable development in the 
organisational culture
A comprehensive capacity-building programme 
should be instigated within Ofgem. This will 
improve understanding of sustainable development 
at all levels, focusing in particular on the social and 
environmental aspects. 
At present, we do not believe the organisational 
culture within Ofgem reflects the imperative of 
sustainable development in general, and climate 
change in particular, strongly enough. The majority 
of staff do not appear to take sufficient account of 
social and environmental issues in their work. The 
social and environmental teams appear severely 
under-resourced and unable to input to the 
breadth of policy issues, which is compounded by 
departmental structures. 
We recommend that Ofgem undertakes a capability-
building programme for its staff on sustainable 
development. 
In the next section, we look in more detail at Ofgem’s 
role in delivering sustainable development. 
Living within environmental limits
For Ofgem, the importance of the strategic policy 
context is in implementation. In carrying out its 
regulatory responsibilities Ofgem must, in our 
view:
• improve access to the electricity markets 
for combined heat and power (CHP) and 
renewable generation
• improve access to the grid for renewable 
generation from remote locations, which is 
currently heavily penalised, and 
• strengthen the electricity networks to cope 
with distributed generation (beyond like-for-
like technology replacements). 
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In view of the approaching Price Control Reviews, we 
recommend a Greenhouse Gas Incentive Package 
is created for use in the Price Control Reviews. (In 
part, this is a strengthening of incentives already 
introduced by Ofgem in the 2005 Distribution Price 
Control Reviews.) Our specific recommendations are:
• The distribution losses incentive should be 
strengthened and set at a level consistent 
with the current social cost of carbon. We 
recommend using the current social cost of 
carbon of £80/tC, which would raise the 
losses incentive to £85/MWh. 
• The distributed generation incentive should 
be reviewed in the light of the work being 
undertaken by United Utilities and the 
University of Sussex. The ability of the 
distribution networks to handle increasing 
two-way power flows through active 
management should be also supported.
• Investment should be stimulated by raising 
the Innovation Funding Incentive (IFI) closer 
to the level of the UK average expenditure on 
innovation (2% of turnover). Privatisation of 
the electricity system has led to a significant 
deficit in knowledge, with little opportunity 
for more innovation over the past decade. 
• Innovation should be supported further by:
	 -  Widening the scope of the Registered 
Power Zones (RPZs) – the areas where 
innovative solutions can be tested. This 
means changing from a focus solely on the 
connection of distributed generation to one 
which includes any innovative means of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
	 -  Ensuring that further support is available 
for innovative solutions to be trialled 
by other operators by allowing some IFI 
support. Existing Ofgem rules on RPZs 
severely limit wider deployment of 
innovative technologies as it is assumed 
the technologies become commercially 
viable once demonstrated and are then not 
eligible for further funding.
We have examined an additional range of options 
for change (see AEA research supporting this 
report), but we conclude that a greenhouse gas 
incentive package as outlined above would be the 
most compatible in the short-term with the existing 
framework introduced by Ofgem. It also would be 
effective in supporting an increase in access by 
renewables to the network.
On the transmission network, connection of 
renewables is being severely delayed due to 
capacity constraints. We recommend that a 
‘connect then manage’ approach is adopted to 
facilitate renewables entry from whatever location, 
with management of the balance between high 
and low carbon energy generation once connected. 
This will enable the network companies to progress 
with connections onto the grid, even while awaiting 
planning approval, particularly for the Beauly-Denny 
transmission line. 
Generators are charged for connection and use 
of the transmission and distribution network. 
Generators in the north of the country tend to pay 
higher charges than those in the south but this 
creates particular problems for CHP generators 
which need to be located close to centres of heat 
demand, and clean generation that is connected 
to the distribution network. We recommend that 
government and Ofgem should review the charging 
arrangements for CHP, or provide additional support 
to CHP, and that Ofgem should ensure that any 
proposals to change transmission charges do 
not disadvantage generators connected to the 
distribution network. The charging system is very 
complex, both in terms of the change in costs as 
different projects connect to the grid, and in terms 
of the industry process for modifying the charging 
arrangements. We recommend that Ofgem ensures 
that the charging system and review process fully 
includes the interests of smaller generators and that 
Ofgem works with National Grid to develop a web 
tool that allows generators to understand the costs 
of connecting to the network. 
In the energy markets, the industry codes (the 
detailed rules governing the functioning of the 
markets) do not include objectives on sustainable 
development. Code modifications (proposals for 
changes to the industry codes) must be assessed 
against how well they contribute to achieving the 
code objectives so industry participants are not 
able to include sustainability considerations in 
their assessment of proposals. The modification 
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process also tends to favour incumbents, as smaller 
participants, which tend to be new entrants, do 
not have the resources to fully participate. We 
recommend that sustainable development is 
included in the code objectives and Ofgem supports 
industry in developing modifications to reflect this 
change. We also recommend that the process is 
simplified to ensure that the interests of smaller 
participants are fully represented. 
Ensuring	a	strong,	healthy	and	
just	society
Ofgem’s interpretation of its primary duty has led 
to significant cuts in the price of energy to the 
consumer, both for industry and for households. 
This temporarily reduces levels of fuel poverty but 
does nothing to reduce the exposure of vulnerable 
consumers to higher energy prices in the future. 
The overall price for energy is heavily dependent 
on global supplies and prices, and recent energy 
price rises have demonstrated that levels of fuel 
poverty have increased and will continue to do so 
unless a strong emphasis is placed on improving the 
energy efficiency of homes. Ofgem is responsible 
for administering the Energy Efficiency Commitment 
(half of which is focused on fuel poor homes), but it 
is not responsible for the policy.
Ofgem has direct responsibility for some issues 
where important improvements could be made, 
including:
• requiring understandable information on 
bills which could influence changes in energy 
consumption behaviour
• improving the quality of metering, so that 
consumers obtain accurate and relevant 
information about their energy use
• mandating standards for green supply tariffs, 
to overcome confusion about what ‘green’ 
energy is and requiring an independent 
audit of companies’ green tariffs to give 
consumers’ confidence that they are receiving 
low carbon electricity
• improving the treatment of low income 
customers, particularly in relation to the high 
tariff for pre-payment meters 
• reducing the reliance on supplier switching 
and corporate social responsibility by energy 
companies as a means of protecting the 
interests of low income and vulnerable 
consumers, although ensuring that wholesale 
price reductions are being passed on to 
low income consumers will continue to be 
important.
A coherent approach to reducing the number of 
estimated bills is needed. This should include 
putting a clear plan in place for the roll out of smart 
metering, which will not only provide suppliers 
with accurate monthly consumption data, but also 
stimulate consumer interest in saving energy. Ofgem 
is participating in the government funded trials on 
metering and billing which is very welcome. We 
recommend that Ofgem responds rapidly once the 
billing and metering trials are complete though 
a combination of improving the frequency and 
accuracy of bills and a roll-out of smart meters. 
A number of policy measures are aimed at reducing 
the energy bills of low income consumers (including 
EEC, Warm Front, Warm Deal etc) but there remain 
significant difficulties for these consumers to cover 
their fuel costs. Ofgem has focused heavily on 
encouraging consumers to switch energy suppliers 
when their fuel bills rise, but this option is least 
available to low-income consumers who often 
have poor access to internet and other comparison 
services. Prepayment meters are the favoured means 
of controlling the demand from households that 
struggle to pay high fuel bills. However, prepayment 
tariffs with some energy suppliers are significantly 
more expensive than tariffs for households who pay 
by direct debit. This has been exacerbated in recent 
years with an increase in the difference between 
direct debit and prepayment tariffs. Therefore the 
households least able to pay are paying more for 
equivalent levels of warmth and power than higher 
income households. We recommend that Ofgem 
mandates that pre-payment meters should be 
smart meters capable of two-way communication 
so consumers have a better understanding of their 
energy bills. We also recommend that greater 
focus is placed on using post-office deductions and 
fuel direct services. We recommend that Ofgem 
should require suppliers to introduce tariffs for pre-
payment customers that are comparable to the 
tariffs paid by direct debit customers and ensure 
that wholesale price reductions are being passed 
on to all consumers, especially low income and 
vulnerable consumers. 
14 Lost in Transmission Sustainable Development Commission
Our review of the role of Ofgem and its impact on 
achieving a sustainable energy system has revealed 
a number of key opportunities for government to 
achieve a significant shift in its efforts to reduce 
UK carbon emissions through electricity and heat 
generation, transmission, distribution and use. 
We believe the next few years are critical for 
ensuring the infrastructure is put in place to support 
the progressive decarbonisation of the energy 
system. Without investment, such infrastructure 
will not be established, and without the right 
regulatory framework, such investment will not be 
forthcoming. 
In our view, the regulatory framework provided by 
Ofgem requires significant change, and our conclusion 
is that this can be achieved most effectively through 
a change to Ofgem’s primary duty. This would enable 
Ofgem to fully integrate greenhouse gas emission 
reductions into its business and would provide 
a clear and stable framework within which all 
energy generators, suppliers and network operators 
would operate. We believe such a change would 
secure greater consistency in the delivery of the 
government’s energy policy, and would alleviate 
the tensions that currently exist between Ofgem’s 
current approach of strengthening competition, and 
government’s climate change goals. 
Our detailed recommendations on improvements 
to be made through the Price Control Reviews 
align closely with our recommendation on the 
primary duty change. Similarly, we believe that 
our recommendations on the cultural and practical 
changes required within Ofgem as an institution, 
align closely to a change to the primary duty. Ofgem 
is a highly efficient institution for delivering against 
its existing goals, but these goals are no longer 
compatible with aims of government energy policy. 
Unless Ofgem’s goals are aligned with those of 
government, the scale of change that is required to 
meet the government’s climate change and wider 
environmental targets will not be achieved.
Conclusions
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Living within environmental limits
Respecting the limits of the planet’s environment, 
resources and biodiversity – to improve our 
environment and ensure that the natural 
resources needed for life are unimpaired and 
remain so for future generations.
Ensuring a strong, healthy and just society
Meeting the diverse needs of all people in 
existing and future communities, promoting 
personal wellbeing, social cohesion and 
inclusion, and creating equal opportunity.
Achieving a 
sustainable economy
Building a strong, stable and 
sustainable economy which 
provides prosperity and 
opportunities for all, and in 
which environmental and 
social costs fall on those who 
impose them (polluter pays), 
and efﬁcient resource use 
is incentivised.
Promoting good governance
Actively promoting effective, 
participative systems of 
governance in all levels of 
society – engaging people’s 
creativity, energy and diversity.
Using sound science 
responsibility
Ensuring policy is developed 
and implemented on the basis 
of strong scientiﬁc evidence, 
whilst taking into account 
scientiﬁc uncertainty (through 
the precautionary principle) 
as well as public attitudes 
and values.
The Government’s 2003 Energy White Paper5 set out 
a major shift in UK energy policy, with its acceptance 
of the recommendation of the Royal Commission 
for Environmental Pollution of the need for a 60% 
cut in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, to avoid 
dangerous climate change. The White Paper also set 
out four goals of energy policy:
• To put ourselves on a path to cut the UK’s CO
2
 
emissions by some 60% by 2050, with real 
progress by 2020
• To maintain reliability of energy supplies
• To promote competitive markets in the UK 
and beyond
• To ensure that every home is adequately and 
affordably heated. 
These goals have been reinforced in the 2006 
Climate Change Programme Review6 and the 2007 
Energy White Paper.7
In 2005, the Government published its Sustainable 
Development Strategy Securing the Future 
and outlined the five principles of sustainable 
development, within which government policy is to 
be developed and implemented. The five principles 
are:
The energy system is an extremely important part of our lives. We use energy to heat and light our 
homes and power our businesses. In recent years there has been considerable attention paid to the 
way	the	energy	system	operates,	and	how	we	can	gradually	reduce	the	emissions	of	greenhouse	gases	
created	by	burning	fossil	fuels	for	electricity,	heat	and	transport.
‘We want to achieve our goals of living within environmental limits and a just society, and we will do it by 
means of a sustainable economy, good governance and sound science.’8
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Scientific evidence from the 4th Assessment report 
of the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC)9 now indicates that the UK will need to cut its 
carbon emissions below the current target of a 60% 
by 2050. There is also emerging a broad consensus 
that the only way to do this will be for the electricity 
system to be almost completely decarbonised. This, 
then, is the background to the SDC’s review of the 
role of Ofgem.
The	Review	Process
This Review has been carried out through:
• A series of interviews with experts in the 
energy field, including energy suppliers, 
generators, network companies, industry 
commentators, NGOs and academics
• Consultation with an Expert Advisory Group 
• Interviews with Ofgem staff, managing 
directors and the Sustainable Development 
Sub Committee of the Ofgem Authority
• Desk based research into the options for 
change to the energy system10
• Desk based research into international 
comparisons of energy markets in Denmark, 
California and the Netherlands11
• Desk based research into consumer attitudes 
to energy.12
We have approached this project analysing Ofgem’s 
role in the energy system, against the government’s 
five sustainable development principles. Our 
analysis of the institution of Ofgem therefore 
reflects government’s desire for good governance 
to support the two key goals of ‘living within 
environmental limits’ and achieving a ‘strong, 
healthy and just society’. We have also tested our 
recommendations against government’s goal of 
‘achieving a sustainable economy’, to evaluate 
the economic impacts of improving Ofgem’s 
performance in relation to environmental and social 
measures. 
Our findings and recommendations cover:
• Long term, strategic issues about the UK 
energy system and Ofgem’s role in that. 
These elements are framed around policy 
goals, the lessons of the Stern report13 and 
the implications for Ofgem; and
• Shorter term, practical issues that can 
be implemented soon. These cover both 
institutional issues within Ofgem, improved 
conditions for low carbon energy generators, 
and incentive structures for the distribution 
companies. 

How does the current 
energy system work? 
3
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The energy system is complex and far reaching 
but can be summarised as the provision of light, 
heat and power to our homes and businesses. The 
means by which light, heat and power are provided 
varies but typically they can be broken down 
into five sections of the supply chain: generation, 
transmission, distribution, supply and use.
3.1.1 Electricity generation
The provision of light and power comes primarily 
from electricity. Electricity can be generated from 
a number of sources. At present, Great Britain’s 
electricity generation mix is gas 39%, coal 36%, 
nuclear 21%, renewables 4% and other sources 
2%14 as figure 1 shows.15
Figure 1  Generation Mix (2005)
Source: Dukes (2006)
3.1.2 Electricity and gas transmission
The electricity generated is then transmitted through 
the GB transmission system. The transmission system 
for England is owned and managed by National Grid 
Electricity Transmission plc whilst the transmission 
system in Scotland is owned and managed by 
SP Transmission Ltd and Scottish Hydro Electric 
Transmission Ltd (SHETL). Whilst the ownership of 
the transmission system is split between different 
companies, the operation is carried out by National 
Grid in its role as the GB System Operator (GBSO).
The gas transmission system, shown in Figure 3, 
ensures the flow of gas from supply points, such as 
pipelines and liquefied natural gas terminals, to the 
distribution networks. The gas transmission system 
is owned and operated by National Grid. 
3.1.3 Electricity and gas distribution 
The distribution networks carry electricity and gas 
from the transmission systems into our homes and 
businesses. In moving electricity and gas from the 
transmission to the distribution system the voltage 
and pressure have to be changed. In electricity, the 
voltage drops from 400kV on the transmission line to 
a maximum of 132kV on the distribution networks. 
In the same way the pressure of the gas pipeline 
on the transmission system is 85 bar and is reduced 
to 7 bar on the distribution network. The process of 
changing voltage is called transformation.
There are 14 electricity distribution networks owned 
and operated by seven different companies. These 
are Scottish Hydro Electric Power Distribution PLC, SP 
Distribution Ltd, United Utilities, Central Networks, 
CE Electric, Western Power Distribution and EDF 
Energy Networks, as shown in Figure 4.
 
In the past, the eight gas distribution networks 
were owned by National Grid Transco. However in 
2005, four were sold off and these are now owned 
by Scotia Gas, Northern Gas Networks and Wales 
and Western Utilities.
Generation Mix 2005
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2%Other
Coal
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3.1  The Energy System: a snapshot
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Figure 2  Technical flow of electricity
Figure 4  Electricity Distribution AreasFigure 3  Gas Transmission System
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3.1.4 Electricity and gas supply 
Whilst the distribution networks feed energy directly 
into our homes and businesses, the consumer or 
business buys electricity or gas from the energy 
supply companies. At present the market is 
dominated by the ‘big six’ supply companies: E.On 
(Powergen), Centrica (British Gas), EDF Energy, 
Scottish and Southern Energy, RWE (npower) 
and ScottishPower. There are also some smaller 
suppliers such as Good Energy and Ecotricity which 
are serving a smaller proportion of consumers and 
specialist suppliers serving particular markets such 
as businesses.
3.1.5 Electricity and gas use
The electricity and gas used in our homes and 
businesses represents 46% of the UK’s greenhouse 
gas emissions.16 As part of the government’s 
strategy for combating climate change there will 
need to be a significant change in the behaviour of 
consumers to reverse the present trend of increasing 
energy demand. Since 2000, a series of government 
policies have improved energy efficiency and 
contributed to reducing energy demand. The Energy 
Efficiency Commitment (EEC) is a regulation obliging 
energy supply companies to offer energy efficiency 
measures to households, and it has reduced 
energy demand by 86.8 TWh in the first phase.17 
The Building Regulations standards have also been 
raised, and in 2005 achieved particular success 
in reducing household energy use through the 
requirement for all household boiler installations to 
be high efficiency, condensing boilers. This alone is 
expected to reduce emissions by 0.6MtC by 2010.18 
Advice to consumers on energy efficiency is provided 
by the network of Energy Efficiency Advice Centres, 
as well as from energy suppliers. The Low Carbon 
Building Programme has grant aided household and 
community renewables installations. 
The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is 
targeted at improving the energy efficiency of 
more energy intensive installations and the recently 
announced Carbon Reduction Commitment will see 
emissions trading extended to some smaller, less 
energy intensive sites. The government has also 
used taxation policy to reduce energy use, through 
the Climate Change Levy and the Climate Change 
Agreements (with Carbon Trust advice and support 
for business to reduce their energy use). In addition, 
there are grants available for the purchase of micro-
generation technologies that allow households to 
produce their own energy.
3.1.6 Heat use
The provision of heat can come from a number of 
places, but at present most heat is generated in 
homes from central heating systems that run on 
gas. In the same way, the majority of the heat used 
for industrial processes, e.g. distillation, baking and 
drying, is generated from gas. Before arriving in 
the home or business, this gas is transmitted and 
distributed through vast pipe networks before it is 
sold to the end user by a supply company.
However there is another model for heat provision 
which uses the waste heat produced through the 
electricity generation process. This is known as CHP 
generation. This heat is then transmitted via heat 
networks to communities. Successful examples 
include the community heating scheme in Tower 
Hamlets, which utilises a 1.4MWe gas-fired CHP 
plant and provides heat and electricity at 20% 
below the cheapest supplier, saving 2,500 tonnes 
of CO
2
 a year.19 
Good governance
Getting the institutional framework right 
for a low carbon energy system
4
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The development and delivery of energy policy is 
divided between different institutions. For Great 
Britain, policy development is shared between the 
Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform (BERR) on energy supply specifically, and 
the Department for the Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs (Defra) on energy efficiency and 
policies relating to climate change. Policies relating 
to energy end use, such as housing policy, are 
developed between Defra and the Department 
for Communities and Local Government (CLG). In 
relation to the devolved administrations (DAs), 
energy policy is reserved to Whitehall but delivery 
and climate change policy is devolved to the nations; 
tensions can exist between central government 
policy development and the DAs’ approaches.20 
In addition to this split in policy development within 
Whitehall, much of the delivery is now placed in 
separate bodies: 
• the Carbon Trust is funded by government 
to stimulate and support energy efficiency 
in business and to support low carbon 
technological deployment 
• the Energy Saving Trust is funded to stimulate 
energy efficiency and uptake of renewable 
energy technologies in the household sector 
• the Environment Agency implements the 
Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control 
(IPPC) regulations with major energy users, 
and implements the EU ETS with energy 
generators and other industries
• Ofgem is the independent regulator of the 
energy markets and networks, and its powers 
and duties are shared with that Secretary of State
• The Office of Climate Change provides cross-
Departmental analytical support on climate 
change policies, reporting equally to all 
Departments.
Figure 5 Current split of responsibility for energy 
policy and delivery
The soon to be established Climate Change 
Committee is an additional institution whose role 
will have a significant impact on the functions of 
these bodies. The Climate Change Committee will 
set the trajectory for carbon emissions reduction over 
the following 15 years, with five yearly milestones, 
and annual reporting by government to parliament 
on progress to achieving these goals. It is likely that 
proposals from the Climate Change Committee could 
impact on Ofgem; therefore it would be unhelpful if 
Ofgem were to act as a barrier with its primary duty 
unchanged. 
In this section we examine:
• the institutional landscape for energy policy 
• Ofgem’s place in that landscape and where 
this could change
• Ofgem’s delivery of its functions to date, 
where and how these could change 
• Ofgem’s delivery of its sustainable 
development duty, and how this could change.
Sections 5 and 6 of this report develop the reasons 
why there is a need for this change in Ofgem’s 
institutional focus. 
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4.1  The current situation – institutional complexity
Good	 governance	 is	 one	 of	 the	 five	 principles	 of	 sustainable	 development,	 and	 the	 institutional	
framework for the governance of energy policy is a critical element of the successful delivery of two of 
the	other	sustainable	development	principles:	‘ensuring	a	strong	healthy	and	just	society’,	and	‘living	
within	environmental	limits’.	The	governance	of	energy	policy	applies	to	policy	development,	delivery	
and implementation. 
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This is a complex institutional landscape, and in 
SDC’s view could be simplified. As an initial move 
we would strongly recommend that energy and 
environmental policy is brought entirely under the 
control of one Secretary of State.
4.1.1  International comparisons – planning 
for a low carbon future
Our analysis of the operation of energy markets in 
California, Denmark and the Netherlands, which 
have achieved improved implementation of lower 
carbon energy supply solutions, (published as 
background research to this report), reveals very 
different institutional structures to those in the UK:
• California and Denmark made significant 
structural policy decisions some decades ago 
through centralised energy bodies, which also 
had control of planning policy at the local 
level; this was achieved in California through 
an energy commission and in Denmark 
through an energy agency. This effectively 
means the energy markets were highly 
regulated
• Netherlands on the other hand has a 
model closer to the UK where markets are 
competitive and policies are decided by 
the Ministry for Economic Affairs. However 
delivery is carried out through Senter Novem 
which has responsibility for implementing 
policy on innovation, energy and climate 
change, environment and spatial planning. 
The role of heat in the energy market is 
also a key difference between the UK and 
Denmark and the Netherlands
• All three have very powerful energy agencies 
linking the delivery of energy policy with 
spatial planning powers
• The role of the economic regulator is 
relatively new in many of these countries 
but prior to their establishment, their roles 
were carried out by the energy agency which 
tied together regulation, environmental and 
planning issues.
What is clear from the international evidence is the 
importance of a centralised agency responsible for 
delivering government policy. These findings also 
highlight the difficulties that the current UK energy 
market has in achieving a significant shift to a low 
carbon energy system:
• UK energy policy since the 1990s has been 
to ensure a competitive energy market with 
specific and regulated conditions, and the 
regulator, Ofgem, was created in this context. 
Within that liberalised energy market, 
interventions occurring over the past decade 
to improve environmental performance have 
been instituted as market corrections. As 
such, the Renewables Obligation (RO) and the 
EEC have been effective in improving progress 
towards a low carbon energy system. But 
because Ofgem sees itself as an economic 
regulator, it views policy interventions like 
the RO and EEC as interventions distorting 
the functioning of the market. Institutionally, 
because it regards such policies as 
interventions it consequently does not embed 
the core objective of these policies, carbon 
reduction, into its mainstream thinking. In 
addition, Ofgem considers the carbon price 
achieved through the EU ETS to be the sole 
policy instrument needed to move to a low 
carbon energy system. This is optimistic and 
inconsistent with the conclusions of the Stern 
review where a combination of a price of 
carbon, taxation, regulation, innovation and 
behaviour change is clearly identified. 
• The creation of Energy Agencies in 
Denmark, the Netherlands and California 
with responsibility for energy policy from 
development through to delivery contrasts 
strongly with the UK’s institutional structure. 
In Denmark and the Netherlands, this is 
coupled with planning policy that supports 
the systematic development of heat networks 
to reduce the waste heat and greenhouse 
gas emissions associated with the centralised 
electricity supply system typical of the UK 
energy infrastructure (discussed separately 
under section 5.2). The SDC recognises the 
approach in this country must be consistent 
with a liberalised energy system.
Nonetheless, in view of the complexity of the 
institutional landscape in the UK, we think it is 
important for energy policy to be retained within 
the responsibility of Whitehall as now (with 
devolved issues as now), and that decisions on 
such an important part of government policy should 
be retained around the Cabinet table, with one 
Secretary of State having overall responsibility. 
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Ofgem’s duties and powers were established at 
its founding in the 1990s, to promote effective 
competition in the newly liberalised markets and 
improve the efficiency with which the monopoly 
companies operate. As a result of Ofgem’s activities, 
wholesale and retail energy prices fell substantially 
in the years after privatisation, whilst operating 
efficiencies increased. There is no doubt that 
Ofgem successfully streamlined the former energy 
companies, and this success should not be under-
estimated. 
Since Ofgem’s creation, the challenges for the 
energy system have changed. In 2000, Ofgem was 
given new duties to contribute to government’s 
social and environmental objectives and in 2004 it 
was given a duty to contribute towards sustainable 
development. All these new duties were additional 
to Ofgem’s primary duty, which did not change. In 
addition to its single primary objective, Ofgem has 
a series of 11 secondary duties.
4.2.1	 Ofgem’s	primary	duty
The duties and powers of Ofgem are endowed on 
the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority (GEMA) 
and in this context we refer to the Board of 
Ofgem as the Authority. The Authority’s primary 
duty when carrying out its functions is to protect 
the	 interests	 of	 consumers,	 present	 and	 future,	
wherever	 appropriate,	 by	 promoting	 effective	
competition	 between	 persons	 engaged	 in,	 or	
in	 commercial	 activities	 connected	 with,	 the	
shipping,	transportation	or	supply	of	gas	conveyed	
through	pipes	and	the	generation,	transmission,	 
 
distribution or supply of electricity or the 
provisions or use of electricity interconnectors.
The Authority must when carrying out its functions 
have regard to: 
• The need to secure that so far as it is 
economic to meet them, all reasonable 
demands in Great Britain for gas conveyed 
through pipes are met
• The need to secure that all reasonable 
demands for electricity are met
• The need to secure that licence holders are 
able to finance the activities which are the 
subject of obligation on them
• The interest of individuals who are disabled 
or chronically sick, of pensionable age, with 
low incomes, or residing in rural areas 
Subject to the above, the Authority is required to 
carry out the functions referred to in the manner 
which it considers is best calculated to:
• Promote efficiency and economy on the part 
of those licensed under the relevant Act and 
the efficient use of gas conveyed through 
pipes and electricity conveyed by distribution 
system or transmission systems
• Protect the public from dangers arising from 
the conveyance of gas through pipes or the 
use of gas conveyed through pipes and from 
the generation, transmission, distribution or 
supply of electricity
• Contribute to the achievement of sustainable 
development; and
• Secure a diverse and viable long-term  
energy supply.
4.2	 Ofgem’s	duties	and	powers
The changes proposed by the SDC to the institutional 
structure would include a change to the function of 
Ofgem, and, in our view, such a change urgently 
requires a re-examination of Ofgem’s duties, and its 
interpretation of these duties. We have undertaken 
this examination, and our findings are outlined 
below. Whatever institutional structure is adopted – 
either an Energy Delivery Agency, or a preservation 
of the existing demarcation of responsibilities – 
Ofgem’s primary duty has to be changed to avoid the 
current misalignment with energy policy objectives, 
and to better facilitate the move to a sustainable 
energy system.
Recommendation
 
• The opportunity to bring energy and 
environment policy together under one 
Secretary of State was rejected within the 
2007 machinery of government changes.  
We recommend that this change be made at 
the next opportunity.
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In carrying out the functions referred to, the Authority 
must also have regard to:
• The effect on the environment of activities 
connected with the conveyance of gas 
through pipes or with the generation, 
transmission, distribution or supply of 
electricity
• The principles under which regulatory 
activities should be transparent, accountable, 
proportionate, consistent and targeted only 
at cases in which action is needed and any 
other principles that appear to it to represent 
the best regulatory practice.
• Certain statutory guidance on social and 
environmental matters issued by the 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry.
4.2.2	 Ofgem’s	interpretation	of	its	Duties
In taking a decision, the Authority must consider 
how each of the secondary duties might be relevant. 
So the duty to have regard to environmental and 
social guidance (as issued by the Secretary of 
State) is just one factor influencing a final decision. 
The influence this secondary duty has on the 
decision could be considerable, but only so long as 
the final decision is considered to be still in line with 
the primary duty. Therefore Ofgem’s interpretation 
of its primary duty is of paramount importance in 
assessing its perceived ability, or willingness, to 
actively contribute to the UK’s energy policy goal of 
cutting CO
2
 emissions by 60% by 2050.
In evaluating the relative importance of the secondary 
duties against the primary duty, the Authority gives 
a value to the social cost of environmental damage 
and incorporates this into its economic calculations. 
Ofgem has been routinely undervaluing carbon in 
its calculations. Decisions that enable environmental 
improvements are effectively only those with 
minimal economic impact, and therefore the scope 
to implement environmental improvements is 
severely restricted. 
The Authority has a secondary duty to pay particular 
attention to the interests of consumers on low 
incomes.21 This is reinforced by the sustainable 
development duty and the Social and Environmental 
Guidance, both of which include social issues within 
their scope. However, the interpretation of the 
duty effectively means the primary duty sets the 
upper limit on the Authority’s discretion to act. 
This has resulted in the Authority being extremely 
unwilling to implement additional support for low 
income consumers, as it perceives the interests of 
all consumers to be adversely affected, perhaps 
through a small increase in energy bills. 
The interests of present consumers
The Authority’s primary duty22 is to protect the 
interest of ‘consumers, present and future, wherever 
appropriate by promoting effective competition…’ 
This objective relates to the interests of GB consumers 
only when they are acting in their capacity as 
consumers of electricity and gas. It does not relate 
to consumers’ interests as consumers of any other 
goods or services, as citizens more generally or as 
members of the general public.
The interests of consumers, defined in this way, have 
been interpreted by the Authority as relating 
mainly	 to	 price,	 availability,	 quality	 of	 service	
and security.23  The Authority is free to decide what 
constitutes the consumer interest, and can take 
account of the views of consumer groups, surveys, 
focus groups or any other sources it considers relevant. 
This interpretation of the consumer interest covers 
industrial, commercial and domestic consumers, and 
applies equally to rural and urban consumers. 
Ofgem has recently announced the Consumer First 
programme which aims to improve the way Ofgem 
takes consumers’ interests into account. As part 
of this, Ofgem has recently published the findings 
from a series of deliberative events investigating 
consumers’ attitudes to energy and the environment. 
We welcome this research by Ofgem to explore the 
range of factors that could make-up the interest of 
consumers.
The application of the interpretation will differ, 
depending on the scope of the decision in question. 
For example, large industrial companies would 
generally be considered better able to negotiate 
the price of their electricity and gas supply on 
equal terms with a supply company than domestic 
consumers. Domestic consumers therefore require 
a greater level of protection in this respect. Large 
industrial companies would be expected to have 
a different view from domestic consumers on the 
value of a reliable and predictable energy supply.
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The interests of future consumers
The ‘interests of future consumers’ are also defined 
by the Authority as the interests of future consumers 
in their capacity as consumers of electricity and 
gas. This is again interpreted as relating mainly 
to price, availability and security. While present 
consumers may be willing to pay for environmental 
improvements for future consumers, the Authority, 
before committing additional expenditure, needs to 
be confident that present consumers should and are 
willing to pay for these through their electricity and 
gas bills, rather than through general taxation. 
The Authority would generally be looking at the 
near-term future, usually defined as the lifetime of 
network investments (around 40 years), although 
most of its considerations relate to much shorter 
time scales. It has been suggested by contributors 
to this review that Ofgem may not be delivering 
the sort of medium to long-term thinking needed 
for ensuring security of supply, particularly in the 
context of an expected fall in electricity generation 
capacity in 10-15 years time.
Low Income Consumers
Ofgem has a duty to protect the interests of vulnerable 
and low-income households. The price of electricity 
and gas is especially important to low income 
consumers. Therefore the Authority’s interpretation of 
the interests of consumers as relating mainly to price, 
availability, quality of service and security, extends to 
the interests of low income consumers. 
However, the problem with this approach is that 
in many instances the interests of different groups 
of consumers may, and often do, differ. Therefore, 
many of the Authority’s decisions involve making 
implicit value judgements. However there is little 
transparency over how these judgements are made, 
and the Authority rarely assesses the impact of a 
policy across the different income deciles. The SDC 
believes the Authority should be testing policy 
options against these different income deciles. 
Where an additional cost is proposed, this should be 
looked at in terms of the proportion it represents of 
consumers’ total income. Where a proposed policy 
is likely to have significant redistributive effects or 
particular impacts on certain groups, more detailed, 
quantitative analysis should be undertaken to inform 
the Authority’s decisions, and should be published, 
for example, in the Impact Assessment.
The need to take balanced decisions also extends 
to those instances in which measures to protect the 
environment might impose costs on low income 
consumers. In these instances, the Authority should 
make explicit its reasoning for deciding which path 
to follow. The sustainable development duty further 
underlines the need for transparency in balancing 
economic, social and environmental factors. In 
practice, the Authority needs to pay particular 
attention to mitigating any negative effects that a 
particular decision may have on the interests of low 
income consumers. 
Environmental	Objectives
The Social and Environmental Guidance was re-
issued by government in 2004 to help Ofgem in its 
interpretation of social and environmental issues. 
However, there is a sentence in the Guidance which 
we think undermines empowerment of Ofgem to be 
more ambitious in its implementation of social and 
environmental measures. This is: 
‘Where the Government wishes to implement 
social and environmental measures which 
could have significant	financial	implications for 
consumers or for regulated companies, these 
will be implemented by Ministers, rather than 
the Authority, by means of specific primary or 
secondary legislation.’24 
Our understanding from contributors who were 
engaged in the Energy White Paper 2003 is that 
Ofgem asked for this sentence to be included in the 
Guidance, because they considered their duties to be 
incompatible with this issue.
This sentence in the Guidance is being interpreted 
by Ofgem as a strong limitation on their ability to 
implement solutions going beyond the current 
interpretation of their primary duty. It is also 
restricting their ability to act to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions or eradicate fuel poverty. However it 
is worth noting that the term ‘significant’ is subject 
to the Authority’s discretion, as is the fact that even 
when there is Guidance from Ministers, the Authority 
is only obliged to consider the relevance of the 
Guidance, and may take a different view from the 
view in the Guidance. Such an interpretation has 
not been made, to our knowledge, in the case of 
environmental and social decisions that go beyond 
Ofgem’s current interpretation of their primary duty.
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The evidence from both this section of this review, 
on Ofgem’s practical interpretation of its duties, 
and evidence elsewhere of the impacts Ofgem’s 
decisions have had on the development of the 
electricity networks and the energy markets, has 
convinced the SDC that there is a need for Ofgem’s 
primary duty to be changed to align more closely 
to the need for the UK to limit greenhouse gas 
emissions across the energy system.
SDC’s recommendation to government is for Ofgem 
to remain an independent regulator, but with a 
broader interpretation of the interests of consumers. 
As such, the means by which it achieves its primary 
duty would no longer be solely through promoting 
competition but also through reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions, thereby giving more weight to the 
interests of future consumers. In addition it would 
not only be responsible for regulating monopoly 
networks in electricity and gas, but also in heat.
The inclusion of heat in the primary objective would 
however need to be accompanied by new powers 
for Ofgem. The SDC proposals for licensing heat 
network development through the existing network 
operators or third parties would require the creation 
of legislation to give Ofgem specific powers for the 
licensing of heat provision. An alternative would be 
to grant Ofgem a broader power to pursue policies 
to promote the use of lower carbon heat sources.
With greenhouse gas reduction included, the new 
primary duty in relation to electricity could then 
read either: 
 
Option A1
The principal objectives of the Secretary of State and 
the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority (in this Act 
referred to as ‘the Authority’) in carrying out their 
respective functions under this Part are as follows:
a) to reduce the emission of greenhouse 
gasses	in	accordance	with	[targets	notified	
by the Secretary of State to the Authority/
National	Policy	Statements	on	greenhouse	
gas emissions reductions/Government 
targets for greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions].
b) subject	to	such	measures	as	the	Authority	
considers appropriate in the performance 
of	its	objectives	set	out	in	a)	above, to 
protect the interests of consumers in relation 
to electricity conveyed by distribution 
systems or transmission systems, wherever 
appropriate, by promoting effective 
competition between persons engaged in, 
or in commercial activities connected with, 
the generation transmission or supply of 
electricity or the provision or use of electricity 
interconnectors.
Option A2
The principal objectives of the Secretary of State and 
the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority (in this Act 
referred to as ‘the Authority’) in carrying out their 
respective functions under this Part are as follows:
a) to protect the interests of consumers in 
relation to electricity conveyed by distribution 
systems or transmission systems wherever 
appropriate by promoting effective 
competition between persons engaged in, 
or in commercial activities connected with, 
the generation, transmission, distribution or 
supply of electricity or the provision or use of 
electricity interconnectors; and
b) subject	to	such	measures	as	the	Authority	
considers appropriate in the performance 
of	its	objectives	set	out	in	(a)	above,	to	
reduce the emissions of greenhouse gasses 
in	accordance	with	targets	notified	by	the	
Secretary of State to the Authority.
Option B
The principal objectives of the Secretary of State and 
the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority (in this Act 
referred to as ‘the Authority’) in carrying out their 
respective functions under this Part is to protect 
the interests of consumers in relation to electricity 
conveyed by distribution systems or transmission 
systems, wherever appropriate by promoting 
effective competition between persons engaged 
in, or in commercial activities connected with, the 
generation, transmission, distribution or supply 
of electricity or the provision or use of electricity 
interconnectors, while reducing the emissions of 
greenhouse gasses in accordance with [targets 
notified	by	the	Secretary	of	State	to	the	Authority/	
National	 policy	 Statements	 on	 greenhouse	 gas	
emissions reductions/Government targets for 
greenhouse gas emissions reductions].
4.3	 	Shaping	Ofgem’s	duties	for	the	UK’s	low	carbon	energy	future
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Under option A, greater emphasis is placed on the 
obligation in part (a) but the obligation in part (b) is 
still part of the principal objective. Under option B, 
equal weight is given to the two obligations. Similar 
wording would need to be included in Ofgem’s 
duties in relation to gas and any future duties in 
relation to heat. 
It is interesting to examine the primary duties for 
other regulatory bodies. As many of the regulators 
were created during the 1990s there are strong 
similarities between them. However, the Office 
of Rail Regulation (ORR) is relevant here. The ORR 
is subject to a duty to contribute to sustainable 
development, which ranks alongside the duty to 
promote competition and the interest of railway 
users. There is no reason why the predictability or 
transparency of Ofgem’s decision making should be 
compromised by the need to balance consumer/
competition consideration with a policy of reducing 
greenhouse gasses. It is always open to Ofgem 
to ensure that its policies are communicated as 
openly and transparently as possible, e.g. through 
publishing guidance, consultation, etc. This is a 
far more effective guarantee of predictability and 
transparency than the current wording of the 
Ofgem’s principal objective which is, in any event, 
open to interpretation.
While there is no particular common thread in 
the statutory duties of other utility regulators, it 
is apparent that (i) not all regulators are required 
to focus on consumer interest and competition as 
their principal duty (as Ofgem is), and (ii) it is often 
the case that the regulator has to balance a range 
of distinct and potentially conflicting factors when 
interpreting its primary duty. We conclude from this 
that there is no fundamental conflict in proposing 
a greenhouse gas emissions reductions element to 
Ofgem’s current primary duty.
The SDC recommends the inclusion of both 
greenhouse gas emissions and heat in Ofgem’s 
primary duty. We feel this new wording would 
explicitly empower Ofgem to take a more proactive 
approach to the delivery of the government’s 
environmental objectives within the context of their 
broader regulatory duties. Government would also 
need to update its guidance to Ofgem to clarify 
interpretation of the new primary duty. 
However, we would caution government against 
simply updating guidance to Ofgem without making 
the necessary changes to the primary duty as we 
have outlined above, as we believe this would 
have minimal impact. Ofgem is obliged only to 
‘have regard to’ government’s Guidance, and 
therefore government must not rely on this means 
of influencing Ofgem’s delivery functions. We are 
also not convinced that increased Guidance from 
government is necessarily the best way to influence 
an independent regulator to meet its objectives; 
rather the objective needs to be more clearly focused 
on the goals government is aiming to achieve. 
We believe clarity in the primary duty will help 
maintain investor confidence and understanding 
of what Ofgem will have to deliver, and how this 
will impact on existing processes such as the Price 
Control Reviews. 
Some contributors have suggested that a change 
to the primary duty would create uncertainty in the 
energy markets and undermine investor confidence. 
However, our view is that frequent revision of 
government guidance is more likely to threaten the 
political independence of an economic regulator 
and hence create uncertainty in the market. A 
clear change to the primary duty, an option which 
requires primary legislation, is less likely to cause 
uncertainty in the market because the duty will not 
change as frequently as guidance could. 
Recommendations
• To revise Ofgem’s primary duty to incorporate 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and 
the supply of heat
• In line with our recommendations on a new 
primary duty for Ofgem, that the interests of 
present and future consumers are explicitly 
articulated to allow for defensive investment 
in technologies that can contribute to wider, 
global environmental challenges, such as 
climate change
• That the sentence in Ofgem’s guidance 
restricting Ofgem’s implementation of 
environmental or social measures that might 
impose ‘significant financial implications 
for consumers or for regulated companies’ 
be amended to clarify the meaning of 
‘significant financial implications’, and 
to state what level of impact on bills is 
considered excessive. 
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4.3.1 Issues taken into consideration
In undertaking this review, and coming to this 
conclusion, SDC recognises that there are many 
issues to be taken into account when a change in 
duties is proposed, including that:
• Investor confidence in the energy sector, both 
in the energy markets and networks, needs 
to be maintained
• Government’s stated policy is to support 
liberalised energy markets; that intervention 
needs to be clearly articulated as a public 
good, and that regulatory burden is not 
unduly increased
• Long term issues must receive due weight 
alongside shorter-term issues, and impacts  
on energy prices are recognised
• Democratic accountability needs to be 
maintained on energy policy decision-
making.
Investor	confidence
In our discussions with energy suppliers and network 
operators, confidence in the way in which the energy 
system is managed was mentioned as a key issue. 
However, with a clear new primary duty, the energy 
sector can still be secure in understanding the 
direction of Ofgem and government’s goals. In fact, 
the tension between government’s stated energy 
and climate change policy goals, against Ofgem’s 
interpretation of its primary duty, was identified 
as a source of conflict, with complex relationship-
building engaged in by the energy companies, to 
ensure they influenced the multiple players. 
In many ways the most important issue for energy 
companies is a secure framework for both energy 
policy and the regulatory process that discharges 
that policy, as this creates certainty and leads to 
a reasonable cost of capital for the players. So a 
carbon market framework is essential for low carbon 
investment to be secure in the long term, but a 
guaranteed carbon price is not essential, and indeed 
is impossible for government to achieve alone. Thus 
the creation and maintenance of the EU ETS, and the 
strengthening of that market through progressively 
tighter national allocation plans (achieved across 
27 Member States) is vital for energy suppliers to 
gain investor support for investments in low carbon 
energy generating technologies. Although this is 
outside Ofgem’s remit, a move to align Ofgem’s 
primary duty behind this structure would strengthen 
investor confidence that government is serious 
about the long-term future for low carbon energy 
systems. 
Market	liberalisation	vs	public	good
Energy market liberalisation was the goal in the 
1990s when the markets were privatised, and 
this was the context in which Ofgem was created. 
However, there has been a consistent recognition 
in government that a completely liberalised energy 
market cannot of itself deliver government’s 
low carbon objectives. Hence, the Non Fossil Fuel 
Obligation was introduced in the 1990s followed by 
the RO for electricity generation. On the demand 
side, the Energy Efficiency Standards of Performance 
(EESOP) was followed by the EEC for energy end 
users, and the Climate Change Levy for business 
energy users. We do not therefore believe there is a 
fundamental contradiction in aligning energy policy 
delivery behind a policy that protects a public good. 
Realigning Ofgem’s primary duty, to support the 
delivery of the public good is consistent with this 
approach.
The realignment we propose does not add to 
regulatory burden; it will make energy policy 
implementation better aligned with a range of 
government objectives, requiring fewer adjustments 
to correct unintended consequences, as has 
characterised the implementation of electricity 
trading arrangements (covered elsewhere in this 
review).
Long-term	vs	short-term
Ofgem arguably takes a short-term view of energy 
supply issues, in the main concentrating on keeping 
the lights on, which is a reasonable goal. It does 
take a slightly longer-term view in the Price Control 
Review process (where a 20 year timeframe is 
considered), but the major focus remains on the 
following five years, so network investments are 
planned in line with anticipated demand. Longer 
term security of supply issues are addressed by 
ensuring clear price signals that will allow increased 
demand to be met with increased supply. Today, the 
long-term objective is not around ensuring a low 
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Ofgem is organised over four divisions: Operations, 
Corporate Affairs, Networks and Markets. At the 
top of the organisation is the Authority made up 
of eight non-executive directors and four executive 
directors. The Energy Act 2004 gave Ofgem a new 
secondary duty to carry out its functions in the 
manner it considers is best calculated to contribute 
to sustainable development. Internal structures 
were reviewed at around the same time. 
Ofgem’s organisational structure has proved 
exceptionally effective at enabling it to deliver 
against its primary duty in a coherent, professional 
and efficient manner and the processes in place 
for decision making were designed to reflect this 
(see below). At around the same time as the 
introduction of the sustainable development duty, 
senior staff changes led to a reorganisation of social 
and environmental functions and fragmentation of 
the team. 
In 2005, Ofgem reorganised its internal structures 
into four divisions with the Environmental Policy 
team brought into the Markets division and Social 
Policy included in the Corporate Affairs Division. 
Environmental programmes such as the RO, EEC 
and Levy Exemption Certificates became the 
responsibility of the Environmental Programmes 
Unit, which is housed in the operations division. 
Subsequently, environment policy has been merged 
with the European team to create a European 
Strategy and Environment directorate and the 
social policy team has been restructured to focus 
on social policy development and delivery. Ofgem 
has recently advertised for a new director post to 
give greater focus to social policy in decision making 
discussions.
In addition, Ofgem set up a sustainable development 
sub-committee to the Authority to ensure that the 
issues were understood at the non-executive level. 
This sub-committee oversaw the production of 
Ofgem’s sustainable development report in 200625 
which outlined how the organisation contributes 
to sustainable development and would look to 
contribute further over the coming year.
carbon outcome but towards ensuring a competitive 
one. The much longer term development of the 
energy system – for example, planning a network 
investment programme to align with government’s 
2050 carbon emission reduction goals – is not 
sufficiently on Ofgem’s agenda, particularly in its 
regulation of the networks. 
A longer-term view is needed around the framework 
for regulating the network companies. As has been 
emphasised in the Stern Review, infrastructure 
investment decisions made now and over the next 
five to ten years are particularly critical in setting 
the UK on the right path to a low carbon economy, 
and this is particularly true in the electricity supply 
networks. The UK’s centralised electricity supply 
system was developed post war, with much of 
the 1960s technology now coming to the end of 
its natural life of around 40 years. Investment in 
electricity networks now will need to be aligned 
with the 2050 carbon emission reduction target, to 
set the UK on an emission reduction path. 
While Ofgem has boosted network operators’ ability 
to invest, to £10bn over the next five years, replacing 
like with like may well mean that new technology 
options looking to connect to the system in the 
future may find it more difficult than if the networks 
were allowed to develop in a way that made them 
flexible enough to connect new generation in a 
variety of ways. This means developing distribution 
systems so that they are more actively managed and 
capable of carrying electricity in two directions whilst 
also managing voltage. It is likely that tomorrow’s 
technologies will require a grid that is more advanced 
than the technology available in the 1960s.
Democratic accountability
Our proposal maintains accountability for energy 
policy within the democratic process, so the 
Secretary of State would have overall responsibility. 
Our proposal for reforming Ofgem’s primary duty in 
no way undermines this; rather it reinforces delivery 
behind the goals defined through the democratic 
process.
4.4	 	Ofgem’s	organisational	structure	for	sustainable	development
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The limited resource of the environmental and 
social policy teams means that there are constraints 
on the extent to which their expertise can be drawn 
upon by other policy teams in the organisation. 
Relying on small teams of expertise is insufficient 
for embedding sustainable development across an 
organisation, and holistic training, management and 
guidance are needed throughout the organisation.
4.4.1  Internal processes for sustainable 
development
There are two different processes for decisions in 
Ofgem:
• Either through an industry code panel, for a 
code modification proposal, or
• Through an internal process such as the 
network Price Control Reviews. 
Code modifications are the process by which changes 
are made to the detailed set of rules governing 
the energy markets. The modifications are taken 
through an industry-based panel; proposals are 
developed and consulted on, and Ofgem then 
takes a view on whether the proposal should be 
accepted or not. Whilst this process does enable all 
industry to participate, smaller players complained 
to us, in the course of this Review, that they did 
not always have the resources to participate 
fully in these multiple panels. The bias is often 
therefore in favour of large players’ proposals. 
In addition sustainable development is not included 
as an objective against which any proposal can be 
proposed or assessed.
Within Ofgem, once the code modification has 
been through this process, a policy lead drafts a 
response, and invites comments across Ofgem on 
the proposal, which then requires the appropriate 
teams, including the resource-constrained social and 
environmental divisions if appropriate, to contribute 
to the draft response. If a decision is considered 
to be ‘important’ a Regulatory Impact Assessment 
(RIA) will be carried out, and the final decision will 
be made by the Authority, taking the policy advice 
and the RIA into account. Ofgem’s decision, when 
published, would be the evidence for any judicial 
review, should it occur at a later date. 
For any major project originating with Ofgem, such 
as a transmission or distribution price control, the 
decision making process is different. The price 
controls operate through project teams with a 
project board. The project team under the project 
lead develops the proposals and the project board 
comments on and guides the work before any 
papers are passed to the Executive and Authority 
for decision making. As such, the project board has 
a very important role.
Sustainable development is represented in this 
process through the project board which will be 
attended from time to time by a member of the 
environmental and/or social policy units, depending 
on the issue being discussed. For example project 
team discussions on extending the gas network will 
include a representative from the social policy unit. 
The project board is responsible for guiding the 
direction of the project to ensure that all issues are 
covered by the policy proposals. The project board 
however does not draft and propose the policies; 
this is done by the project team. The extent to which 
a project will include an environmental and social 
perspective is as much to do with the direction given 
from the project board as it is to do with the skill set 
of the more junior members of staff developing the 
policy papers, and the willingness of the project lead. 
For sustainable development to be fully delivered, 
it is important for expertise to be available across 
the organisation (via the project board) as well as 
vertically, through all grades of staff. One of the most 
important ways in which this vertical integration 
occurs is through the production of RIAs.
 
Ofgem undertakes an impact assessment in cases 
where it considers the decision to be ‘important’, 
i.e. where its implementation would be likely to do 
one or more of the following:
• Involve a major change in the activities 
carried out by the Authority
• Have a significant impact on the market 
participants in the gas or electricity sectors
• Have a significant impact upon a person 
engaged in commercial activities connected 
to the gas or electricity sectors
• Have a significant impact on the general 
public in Great Britain or in a part of Great 
Britain, or
• Have significant effects on the environment.
An RIA will be undertaken if a policy is proposed by 
the Authority and before any final decision is taken. 
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However, for those policies which the Authority is 
not minded to propose, and which are not code 
modifications, an RIA is not completed. In these 
cases the Authority takes a view through the lens of 
its duty set, as to whether it is a policy they would 
consider proposing. There are however a number 
of policy documents which are circulated internally 
to determine whether or not the Authority should 
propose a course of action. These documents do 
not always include a full RIA until the Authority 
has decided on whether it is something which the 
organisation should propose. 
Even then there are policies which have not had a 
full RIA, such as the incentive mechanism aimed at 
reducing emissions of sulphur hexafluoride, a strong 
greenhouse gas, from the transmission system. In 
other cases, an RIA may not be completed and 
even when it is, the point at which the social and 
environmental impacts of a proposed policy are fully 
taken into account is late in the day, well after any 
real qualitative or quantitative assessment could 
actually shape the policy.
4.4.2	 Ofgem’s	social	cost	of	carbon
In 2002, government introduced the Social Cost of 
Carbon, an agreed figure that was to be incorporated 
into policy impact assessments, such as RIAs, to 
evaluate the potential impacts of the policy in relation 
to greenhouse gas emissions. The Government 
Economics Service recommends using a central value 
of the social cost of carbon of £70/tC in 2000 prices 
rising at £1 per year, with a range of £35-140/tC. 
The analysis for the UK Climate Change Programme 
was based on around £80/tC (including inflation). 
The use of a social cost of carbon in calculations was 
a positive move by Ofgem to fulfil its environmental 
and sustainable development duties. However the 
review has uncovered only one instance where the 
full range has been used in cost-benefit analysis 
(the 2007 transmission losses charging RIA) whilst 
in the majority of cases, a much lower figure has 
been used. For example, examination of the losses 
incentive in the 2005 Distribution Price Control RIA 
suggests a figure of around £29/tC was used. The 
2007 transmission losses calculations show that 
Ofgem is moving towards using a cost of carbon 
which is in line with government guidance, and we 
welcome this move. We recommend that Ofgem’s 
guidance on impact assessments is updated, to 
ensure that an appropriate social cost of carbon is 
consistently used.
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Box 2 Distribution Price Control 2005 
Privatisation of the electricity sector led to the use of RPI-X in the Price Control Reviews, for 
setting the level of spend that companies were allowed over the following five year period (i.e. 
authorised funding was based on an increase related to the Retail Price Index (RPI) less a deduction 
for efficiency savings (X)). As a result of aggressive efficiency savings, investment in innovation 
plummeted. The 2005 Distribution Price Control Review set three incentives: to reduce losses, 
to connect distributed generation and to stimulate improved innovation. These incentives are a 
move in the right direction, but their impact has been limited by the cautious level at which the 
incentives are set:
Losses incentive
	 •  set at £48 per MWh saved, and a 50% increase in the incentive since the previous price 
control. The Distribution Network Operators (DNOs) are showing little interest in responding 
to this incentive, as they argue that it is too low to finance new technological or system 
options, and they are therefore favouring ‘like for like’ replacements. Such replacements will 
not minimise the level of losses from the distribution system. Our analysis shows that the 
incentive was based on a cost of carbon of around £29/tC.26  
Innovation	Funding	Incentive	(IFI)
	 •  The Innovation Funding Incentive promotes the demonstration of new technologies in 
Registered Power Zones (RPZ)
	 •  When this idea was first suggested within the organisation it was rejected on the basis that 
‘innovation spending does not always lead to increased value to the consumer as many 
innovative projects fail’ and there was reluctance to micro-manage network operators’ 
activities. However, this barrier was overcome in time, which demonstrates a change in 
attitude within Ofgem
	 •  The level at which the incentives were set is low, with network operators able to spend 0.5% 
of their turnover on innovation. The UK average for innovation expenditure is around 2% of 
turnover. As such the IFI is set at a low level, although in view of the skills shortage facing 
the industry, it would take some time to spend more money on innovation. Incentives for 
innovation need to be sufficiently strong to stimulate an industry that has largely been driven 
by cutting costs and maintaining tight margins
	 •  Registered Power Zones were allowed to be created as areas where innovative solutions could 
be tested. This trebled the Distributed Generation (DG) incentive for DNOs if the connection 
was made and was innovative. The main problem with the IFI and RPZs is that they are 
limited in scope (only focused on connecting DG) and do not incentivise the use of innovative 
solutions beyond the power zone itself. Innovative solutions are often not commercially viable 
immediately, but they are not allowed to receive incentive support for further testing 
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The use of a low cost of carbon is very significant. 
Ofgem’s RIA guidance states that intervention should 
only occur when the cost of the policy proposal is 
proportionate to the outcome. So, if the outcome 
of a policy is to reduce carbon emissions then the 
higher the cost of carbon the greater the ability 
of the organisation to intervene, and similarly, 
assuming a low cost of carbon will reduce Ofgem’s 
willingness to intervene.
The Stern Review suggests that a much higher cost of 
carbon should be used in calculations. Government 
is re-examining the social cost of carbon and Ofgem 
will need to update its value for impact assessments. 
Ofgem has committed to review its RIA guidance (to 
be published in the third quarter of 07/08).
4.4.3	 	Ofgem’s	RIA	Guidance	and	social	
impacts issues
Ofgem’s RIA guidance requires an assessment of 
whether a policy proposal gives rise to any material 
issues relating to unequal distribution of benefits or 
costs between groups or within a group. The guidance 
gives an example of distributional impacts between 
rural and urban customers. An understanding of the 
different householder groups throughout the UK is 
evident at Ofgem’s management executive level 
and within the social policy unit. However as the RIA 
guidance does not clearly articulate how the impact 
on different consumer groups should be assessed, 
it is difficult for many policy officers within Ofgem 
to integrate the diverse range of issues into their 
policy impact assessments.
4.4.4	 	Ofgem’s	capacity	to	deliver	sustainable	
development
Understanding of the implications of sustainable 
development on Ofgem’s day-to-day activities 
appears to be lacking throughout the Ofgem 
structure. There is an over-reliance on the role of the 
RIA Guidance, presumably reflecting a view that the 
RIA process is the appropriate point for considering 
social and environmental impacts. The problem with 
this approach is:
• An RIA is only undertaken for major policy 
changes, and is done on an ad hoc basis 
where the Authority believes it to be 
important, and is carried out late in the policy 
development process, usually once a decision 
is either made, or about to be made
• The Ofgem Guidance is insufficiently detailed 
on social impacts
• It does not include a formal assessment 
of the social and environmental impacts 
where the Authority is not minded to make a 
proposal. 
Capacity within the organisation to understand the 
implications of its work for sustainable development 
is not being developed, and those officials in the 
specialist social and environmental divisions are 
over-loaded with requests for advice. In addition, 
Ofgem’s interpretation of its primary duty works 
against achieving real progress on sustainable 
development. 
Ofgem has recognised that the level of sustainable 
development training needs attention. It has 
recently completed an organisational restructuring 
and HR policies (such as employment, induction 
and training) are being re-examined. Ofgem openly 
admits that it does not currently have training courses 
and induction programmes designed to train new 
and junior staff in how sustainable development 
applies to their day-to-day work. The new HR team is 
looking at how to embed sustainable development 
into performance management systems, and into 
Ofgem’s core values. Ofgem is also developing a 
new leadership and management development 
programme that will include an SD component. This 
is a positive step by Ofgem to improve its capacity to 
deliver on sustainable development and we would 
welcome the opportunity to work with Ofgem in 
developing these programmes. 
4.4.5	 	Ofgem’s	Monitoring	and	Reporting	on	
its SD Duty
Ofgem produced separate environmental and 
social action plans, and in 2006 it published an 
annual report on delivery against its sustainable 
development duty. This report presented Ofgem’s 
contribution in five themes and fourteen indicators. 
Ofgem also reports on its sustainable development 
activities through its corporate strategy which 
outlines its commitment to environmental and 
social objectives. 
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Heat is produced to meet demand in homes, 
businesses and industrial processes. Changing the 
ways in which we generate, distribute and use heat 
is as important as changing the electricity system for 
achieving our environmental goals while meeting 
our energy needs. Heat accounts for 76% of total 
UK energy demand, not including the transport 
sector, and it accounts for 47% of UK carbon dioxide 
emissions. Government recognises the need to 
reduce demand for heat in homes through improving 
household insulation, but whilst this is valuable 
and necessary, it is not a radical reassessment of 
how heat supply could be decarbonised. Such an 
assessment is needed, and in our view Ofgem 
should be a part of this.
Current status of heat
Heat is generated from a number of sources: 68% 
of heat is produced from gas, 14% from oil and 14% 
from electricity, 3% is produced from coal and coke, 
and 1% is produced from renewable sources. 
 
Over two-thirds of the energy input to power 
stations is lost as waste heat. This waste costs the 
UK economy over £5 billion a year.27 Using waste 
heat can contribute to security of supply by reducing 
our reliance on imported gas, and other fossil fuels. 
40% of our gas requirements in 2010 may be met 
by gas imports, (and 90% by 2020).28 Using waste 
heat can also contribute to tackling fuel poverty. 
Ofgem’s duties require it to contribute to government 
social and environmental policy objectives. However, 
we found that the 2006 sustainable development 
report provides no insight into how much Ofgem 
is contributing and how effective its policy 
interventions have been in terms of outcomes. 
Such analysis is needed to know whether Ofgem is 
fulfilling its duty.
Summary
During our examination of Ofgem’s organisation 
structure and decision making process we identified 
four main problems:
• concern about the risk of a judicial review 
has made Ofgem cautious about its decisions, 
using this as a reason for a conservative 
interpretation of its primary duty. This 
leads us to conclude that a revision of the 
primary duty, as outlined above, is the most 
appropriate means of ensuring real change in 
Ofgem’s organisational behaviour
• over-reliance on Ofgem’s part on input 
from under-resourced teams within the 
organisation, and under-resourced industry 
externally, means that the status quo is more 
often maintained
• Ofgem systematically under-values carbon in 
its quantitative processes
• Consideration of social and environmental 
issues often occurs late in the process.  
The industry codes do not contain sustainable 
development as a criterion against which 
modifications can be assessed and the 
publication of RIAs seems to be done on an 
ad-hoc basis, late in the decision making 
process. As such there is no formal process to 
ensure that social and environmental issues 
are addressed in a systematic way for every 
decision
Recommendations
• Ofgem’s duties to be changed to include 
strong reference to greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions to ensure that these issues 
are strongly ingrained in decision making 
processes
• Ofgem to undertake a capability-building 
programme for its staff on sustainable 
development. 
• Ofgem to use the Government’s Green 
Book Guidance and to institute a social cost 
of carbon in compliance with government 
department practice, with a range of 
£35-£140/tC with the mid point of £77/
tC (for 2007); to be updated in line with 
any new social cost of carbon that is agreed 
within government once its evaluation 
of the implications of the Stern Report 
recommendations is complete
• Ofgem’s RIA Guidance to be made explicit 
about assessment of social impacts
4.5  Developing a properly regulated heat market
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District heating networks in Barking are offering 
heat at 3p/therm as opposed to 5p/therm from 
conventional gas boilers.29
In addition to ‘waste heat’ there is also ‘wasted 
heat’ which is lost in homes and business due to 
poor insulation, inadequate draught proofing and 
over-heating of the building. Reducing demand 
for heat helps cut carbon emissions, contributes to 
improving our security of supply, and lowers fuel 
bills. Historically, the supply of cheap, abundant 
North Sea gas has meant that gas has been seen as 
proxy for heat. Now that North Sea gas is in decline, 
a re-evaluation of this policy is urgently needed. 
There are many policy measures in place to encourage 
renewable heat supply (such as biomass), limit 
demand for heat (through the EEC and Warm Front/
Warm Deal programmes), and for CHP systems 
(inclusion in the EU ETS, enhanced capital allowances 
for good quality CHP, reduced business rates and 
reduced VAT on micro-units). However, these will 
not be sufficient to create a substantial shift away 
from gas to lower carbon sources of heat. 
Meeting	heating	demand	in	cities	and	towns
Denmark and the Netherlands have created 
extensive community heating networks, and 60% 
of homes in Denmark are powered by community 
combined heat and power (CHP) networks. Research 
by PB Power and updated by AEA,30 indicates the 
energy and carbon savings to be achieved from 
community heating in the UK. In summary, assuming 
a public sector financing discount rate of 6%, there 
is 18-21 GWe of potential for gas-based community-
based CHP that would cover both residential and 
commercial loads. This equates to a carbon emissions 
reduction of 4.3-5.1MtC/yr or 17-20% of total direct 
household emissions (in 2000). This benefit would 
be significantly increased through greater use of 
renewable-based fuels and industrial waste heat 
(including power station heat).
Work carried out by Delta for the SDC31 highlights 
that it is unlikely that renewable fuel supplies will 
be sufficient to meet the full 18-21GWe but could 
provide around half of this capacity, around 5.5-6.5 
million homes and commercial buildings, or one 
quarter of the UK housing stock. However the up-
front capital cost of developing the full 18-21GWe of 
community CHP schemes is estimated to be £26.5 
– 31 billion.32 Developing a financing regime that 
could spread the cost of this in an acceptable way 
would be critical. 
Using waste heat through CHP and community 
heating schemes face the following barriers:
• High upfront capital costs for CHP generation, 
and for community heating networks
• The relative price difference between gas 
and electricity ‘spark spread’ means that at 
times of high gas wholesale prices and low 
electricity prices the economics of CHP are 
unfavourable
• The locational element of the Use of 
System charge for generators penalises CHP 
generation in the north
• CHP requires long-term contracts for heat 
produced to ensure future sales
• Planning can be a barrier, and some utilities 
are unwilling to invest in community CHP 
schemes because of the administrative 
burden of dealing with the local authority
• Consumers are often suspicious of a new 
heating system; so far the most successful 
schemes have been developed using 
local authority buildings, or are in new 
developments. 
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Box 3 Developing community CHP schemes
There is growing interest in the potential of CHP to reduce the carbon intensity of our energy 
supply. The inclusion of CHP in the Greater London Plan has had the effect of raising the regulatory 
floor, particularly in respect of planning for private developments. There has been a ripple effect in 
the rest of the country with major developers, such as English Partnerships, now looking seriously 
at CHP for delivering against current building regulations, and future changes in 2010. The way 
they do this is typically by energy service companies offering competitive packages to developers, 
or by developers themselves becoming energy service companies, as in the case of Urban Splash.
The carbon savings from generating electricity using CHP technologies, and making use of the 
heat for heating or cooling, depend on many site-specific factors. The most successful examples 
typically exist in large blocks of flats, particularly in mixed use developments, where there is a 
broadly constant aggregate demand. Where a development, or group of developments, is close 
to a hospital or other institutions with a constant demand, this can also help the viability of the 
project. For systems with an electrical output of over 50MWe BERR has estimated that, in the right 
conditions, efficiency savings of between 10 and 23 per cent can be achieved. This is considerably 
more than for smaller systems, with an output of between 1MWe and 50MWe, where efficiency 
savings of 7 to 21 per cent can be achieved.
Despite this potential there are still some regulatory barriers which stand in the way of the wider 
take-up of CHP in suitable sites. One of these is the way the charges from distribution companies 
for carrying locally generated electricity on the system are structured. This is seen by many as 
unfairly biased against small, low-carbon generation plants. 
The reason is that the charges fail to recognise the benefits the generators are bringing for carrying 
their locally-generated renewable or low-carbon energy; on the contrary, they include an element 
for use of the high-voltage transmission system even though the generator is unlikely to make 
any use of it. Although some loss benefits are passed to the generator by the supplier, the charges 
from the distribution company still significantly outweigh these benefits. The charges for importing 
electricity are also unfairly biased against CHP generation that has an atypical demand profile. (This 
is explained in more detail in the Urban Splash case study.)
These charges all feed into the price for imported electricity which is 9.5 pence per kWh while the 
price a generator can expect for exported electricity is just 3.5 pence per kWh. The differential does 
not properly reflect the true costs and benefits to distribution companies.
Finally, there is no regulated framework for the distribution of heat. Developers would welcome 
this since it would create a level playing field for providing heat to households and businesses.
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What role for Ofgem?
There is no overarching regulatory framework for heat 
and in our view this should be corrected. Theoretically 
it would make the most sense for Ofgem to become 
the regulator for heat supply, networks and demand 
management. By integrating heat with electricity 
regulation there should be a coherent relationship 
between electricity and heat, and a more holistic and 
supportive assessment of the contribution that CHP 
can make to the energy mix. 
Recommendation
• That Ofgem becomes a regulator for the 
supply of heat once its primary duty has been 
changed.
Most of the policy levers for fundamentally changing 
the way CHP and community heating schemes are 
developed, lie with government, but Ofgem does 
have a role in enabling willing participants to create 
a fully integrated CHP community system.
If Ofgem became the heat regulator the following 
options could be examined:
• the network charging structures and 
electricity trading arrangements could  
support Combined Heat and Power
• the objectives of industry code panels could 
support heat developments
• incentives could be placed on generators 
through generating licences, to reduce  
heat loss
• The construction of heat networks could 
become one of the permitted activities of gas 
and electricity distribution network operators 
or other parties. 
At present the passive role of network operators 
means that they respond to the actions of determined 
individuals in local authorities to establish heat 
networks (e.g. in Leicester, Sheffield, Southampton, 
Woking and London). Over 43km of pipeline exists in 
Sheffield, delivering nearly 120,000 MWh of heat to 
over 2,800 homes, public buildings and commercial 
properties, across two networks. For every 100 MWh 
of energy supplied by this district CHP scheme, 
31,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide are displaced.
Our fourth option above builds on the current 
business model of network operators, and would 
incentivise them to put heat networks in place. Heat 
network licencees could include groups as diverse 
as local authorities (who could construct heat 
networks as a means of combating fuel poverty) 
and gas or electricity network operators. Gas 
distribution network operators already engage with 
local authorities on pipe repair and replacement 
programmes. Ofgem would be in a position, as 
regulator, to stipulate minimum network standards 
in the network owner licence conditions, similar to 
the Security and Quality of Supply Standard (SQSS) 
on the transmission network.
There would still be a question over how heat 
networks should be financed. One option is to have 
heat networks developed and financed on an entirely 
commercial basis. However, another option is to 
treat the development of heat networks as a matter 
of long term public good, and therefore requiring 
public funding. It is clear that many homes in the 
UK can reduce their CO
2
 emissions only so far with 
energy efficiency measures. Many cities have solid 
wall terraced housing capable of limited efficiency 
improvements (loft insulation, draught-proofing, 
efficient heating systems, appliances and double 
glazing). Micro renewables such as wind turbines 
may also have minimal impact in the middle of 
towns. In some cases solar hot water is attractive, 
as are ground source heat pumps, depending on 
garden space available. But equally, an efficient 
heat network initially powered by gas CHP, could at 
some point in the future be converted to biomass or 
hydrogen, switching the heat demand for the whole 
area to a zero carbon source. While we accept that 
there is considerable cost involved in supporting heat 
network developments, it is clear that there is cost 
involved in many options for energy supply that are 
not considered excessive by government, whereas 
policies for energy demand reduction are frequently 
designed with least cost basis as the driver. 
Estimated costs and carbon benefits of proposal
If 20-40% of future electricity supply was district CHP 
from renewable sources, the energy produced could 
be between 110 TWh and 270TWh, leading to annual 
carbon savings of between 5.7 and 14MtC/yr.
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A one-off cost of £10M-£25M is assumed for 
overseeing the formation of heat networks, and the 
total capital cost is estimated to be £53bn-£88bn 
over several decades for establishing the networks 
and connecting households.32 
The development of such a network would take 
several decades to create, and therefore the 
increase in consumer bills to cover these costs 
would be spread over the years during which the 
developments take place. Case studies developed by 
the EST and the Carbon Trust33 suggest a whole life 
benefit for both retrofit and new build community 
heating schemes.

Environmental limits 
How is Ofgem addressing  
the environmental impacts  
of the UK energy system?
5
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generation to customers via the transmission and 
distribution systems.34 There are also barriers 
to improved demand management and to the 
development of heat networks. We have identified 
the following as the major barriers that could be 
tackled immediately:
Electricity markets:
• The electricity trading arrangements are 
penalising intermittent and small scale 
generation, and requiring them to participate 
in the market as distressed sellers
• The objectives and governance of industry 
code panels frequently support the interests 
of market incumbents to the detriment of 
small scale generators.
We are heartened by those aspects of the Energy 
White Paper 2007 that imply that the delivery 
of energy to consumers will radically change 
after 2011. The context for the Energy White 
Paper is the increasingly clear evidence from the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change that 
climate change is occurring as a result of human 
activity. We have only a decade or so to make a 
fundamental cut in our overall carbon emissions. This 
analysis is backed up in the highly influential Stern 
Review which confirms that radical technology and 
behaviour change is needed over the next decade. 
This means a significant shift in emphasis away 
from a demand driven approach to a fundamental 
re-evaluation of how the necessary production and 
use of energy can be achieved within the context of 
the need very rapidly to reduce carbon emissions. 
In our view, the approach to energy supply and 
demand in California is an interesting model, 
although probably not directly applicable in the UK. 
A mechanism is needed to transform the existing 
energy policy framework into one where energy 
suppliers are incentivised to create a business around 
saving energy, as they do by selling energy units now. 
To this end, we are working further with government 
on the design of the Supplier Obligation for 2011, 
although this is outside the scope of this report. 
In this section, we examine how far Ofgem’s regulation 
of the energy markets and the energy networks has 
succeeded in setting us on the path of a low carbon 
energy system. We also examine ways in which 
greenhouse gas emissions could be saved through 
much more proactive management of the networks, 
and make proposals for ways in which Ofgem’s 
practices could be changed. We particularly focus on:
• Creating a greenhouse gas incentive package 
to reduce the greenhouse gases associated 
with the operation of the network, reduce 
the losses from the networks, reward the 
connection of low carbon generation, and 
promote innovative solutions to reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions
• Enforcing this package by requiring network 
operators to report on their associated 
greenhouse gas emissions
• Increasing the innovation incentives in the 
electricity transmission and distribution price 
and broadening the remit for innovation 
expenditure and demonstration from the 
narrow focus on connecting distributed 
generation to reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions
• Increasing the incentive package for 
distribution network operators to move them 
towards more active management of the 
networks to ensure the system is ‘future- 
proofed’ for the connection of clean local 
generation
• Adopting a ‘connect then manage’ approach, 
to reduce the GB Queue and facilitate the 
connection of low carbon energy, to better 
implement the priority access requirement of 
the renewables directive
• Strengthening mechanisms to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions from the GB 
generating mix.
5.1  What are the barriers to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and 
how can Ofgem overcome these? 
There are a broad range of barriers to low carbon electricity generation in the UK and its movement from 
The	environmental	policy	context	for	Ofgem	will	be	important	over	the	next	few	years,	particularly	as	
the	electricity	networks,	built	in	the	1960s,	become	due	for	replacement.	The	nature	of	this	investment	
will be crucial if the UK is to achieve a decarbonised electricity system. 
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A more complete analysis of the options for action 
to reduce carbon emissions from the energy system 
can be found in the accompanying evidence base to 
this report. In this overview, we have selected some 
of the options that we feel are most likely to deliver 
emission savings within the current framework, and 
are most likely to enable Ofgem to alter its current 
approach to one that better embeds greenhouse 
gas emission reductions into its thinking.
These options are likely to be met only when 
our recommendations for institutional change, 
and change to Ofgem’s primary duty, are also 
delivered. In our view, the options outlined below, 
in themselves capable of delivering improvements, 
will be best developed into fully workable options 
by an institution fit for purpose for this agenda. It is 
also worth noting that many of our recommendations 
depend on Ofgem adopting a proper price for 
carbon. 
5.2.1 Electricity market arrangements
Government and Ofgem introduced the New 
Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) in 2001 
and this was extended to cover Scotland through 
the British Electricity Trading and Transmission 
Arrangements (BETTA) in 2005. These market reforms 
increased competition and contributed to wholesale 
prices falling over that period. Some of these price 
falls have been passed through to consumers and 
in this respect, Ofgem has clearly delivered on 
its primary duty. By focussing on maintaining a 
Electricity networks:
• Capacity constraints are delaying the 
connection of low carbon generation
• 7% of the GB generation output is lost on the 
transmission and distribution networks. This 
is higher than is achieved by best practice 
countries
• For low carbon electricity generation the cost 
of connection to the grid can be prohibitive, 
particularly in the north of England, Wales 
and Scotland
• The RPI-X formula for regulating network 
operation is restricting network operators 
from employing solutions to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. The cost of these 
emissions is not adequately priced within the 
incentive structures of Price Control Reviews, 
therefore insufficient attention is given to 
greenhouse gases through the transmission 
and distribution networks
• The existing energy system is wasteful of 
heat and supply of heat is not properly 
incorporated into the regulatory regime.
Energy consumers:
• Consumer engagement with their energy use 
is poor as one in three bills is estimated and 
presented in terms of p/kWh which is not 
readily understandable to consumers
• The level of complaints relating to domestic 
billing issues in the energy market is six 
times higher than the number of complaints 
received by Ofcom relating to domestic 
telephone bills
• Pre-payment consumers are paying, on 
average, £120 more per year for their energy 
than direct debit customers
• Many green tariffs are misleading consumers 
into believing they are contributing to 
additional environmental outcomes over and 
above a company’s legal obligations
• There is still a strong correlation between 
energy supply company profit and increasing 
energy sold
• The current allowance price within the EU 
ETS is too low to drive energy efficiency and 
demand for low carbon energy.
In an ideal world, the carbon price in the EU ETS would 
itself provide sufficient incentive for generators to 
find additional low carbon generation. This may 
occur in the forthcoming EU ETS period, but whether 
it does or not, the government and Ofgem need to 
find ways to meet UK obligations. This will require 
additional mechanisms for promoting low carbon 
electricity generation.
5.2  Delivering improved environmental performance  
in the energy system
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downward pressure on wholesale and retail prices, 
Ofgem has contributed to achieving government’s 
fuel poverty goals (covered in the next chapter). 
However, the trading arrangements have created 
difficulties for low-carbon energy generation. 
Under BETTA, predictability and flexibility of supply 
is rewarded and intermittent generators like wind 
and CHP are penalised. This increases costs for 
these generators and inhibits their development. 
Small-scale generators face a disproportionate 
burden from the transaction costs of participating 
in the balancing market. The balancing risk is often 
passed to the supply company so that energy from 
small-scale generators is frequently undervalued. At 
the outset of BETTA, it was envisaged that small-
scale generators would sell their energy through 
consolidators who could achieve a better price 
through collective bargaining. However, there is 
presently only one consolidator (SmartestEnergy) in 
the market.
Ofgem oversees the market arrangements including 
decisions on modifications to the industry codes. 
In 2006, Ofgem approved a modification to the 
Balancing and Settlement Code (BSC) (P194) which 
changed the cash out payments (the penalty for 
being out of balance) to a more marginal basis. 
This had a disproportionate impact on intermittent 
generators, which Ofgem explicitly acknowledged 
in its RIA: 
 
‘…if certain generation technologies are less reliable 
than others it is appropriate that they are exposed to 
the costs of managing this. They can either manage 
their exposure by contracting with the demand side 
or other more reliable generators.’35
This approach means new innovative low carbon 
generation must fit within a market framework 
designed for large centralised fossil fuel fuelled 
power stations. An alternative approach would be 
to alter the system architecture to better recognise 
the unique characteristics of low carbon generation. 
A step towards this would be to include the 
achievement of sustainable development in the 
code objectives. This would allow the impact of code 
modifications on sustainability to be fully assessed 
as part of the code modification process.
Code modifications are taken through an industry 
based panel. Proposals are developed and consulted 
on by the industry panel before Ofgem takes a 
view on whether the proposal should be accepted 
or not. Whilst this process does enable all industry 
to participate, smaller players complained to us, in 
the course of this review, that they often did not 
have the resources to participate fully in these 
multiple panels. This creates a bias in favour of 
large participants, usually the incumbents, as they 
have a greater ability to participate in and influence 
the processes. The complexity of the codes and 
the modification process means that the electricity 
trading arrangements as currently operated are 
unlikely to be particularly supportive of small scale 
generators. 
In the recent proposed Connection and Use of System 
Code Modification CAP 148, Ofgem suggested 
environmental costs could arguably be included in 
the deliberations of code panels, under the objective 
relating to economic and efficient system operation. 
This change in position is welcome but does not, in 
SDC’s view, provide enough traction for participants 
looking to make substantive modifications to 
industry codes.
Recommendation
 
• The code modification process to be simplified 
to ensure that the interests of smaller 
participants are fully represented in the 
process
• Ofgem to amend the industry code objectives 
to include sustainable development, and 
support industry in developing modifications 
to reflect any changes in the objectives. 
5.2.2	 Network	charging
The National Grid model for transmission network 
charging for generators contains three elements:
• Connection charges – associated with the 
assets needed to connect a generator to the 
network
• Transmission Network Use of System 
(TNUoS) charges – associated with the cost of 
operating and maintaining the transmission 
network; and
• Balancing Services Use of System (BSUoS) 
charges – associated with the costs of 
balancing the GB system. 
TNUoS charges include a locational element 
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designed to signal the economic and environmental 
cost associated with transmitting electricity and 
hence the benefits of generation capacity being 
located near to centres of demand. 
The locational element of TNUoS charges 
disadvantages renewable or CHP generators in the 
north of the country, which are located where the 
renewable resource is greatest or where there is a 
heat demand. By contrast, fossil fuel generators in 
the south of the country, closer to centres of electricity 
demand, may receive a surplus payment.
It can be argued that renewable generation requires 
less transmission reinforcement than conventional 
generation and so TNUoS should be lower for 
renewable generators. This is because renewables 
will be able to share capacity with conventional 
generators and because renewables tend to occupy 
less transmission capacity at peak periods. Against 
this, it can be argued that the cost of reducing the 
output of conventional plant should be borne by 
renewable generators and that renewables have the 
potential to use a large proportion of transmission 
capacity at peak times. 
In response to this problem, government has capped 
the TNUoS and transmission connection charges 
for renewables in the Orkney Islands, Shetland 
Islands and the Western Isles. Ofgem considered 
this unnecessary as the RO subsidy should cover 
the higher connection charges. Arguably, high 
transmission charges in areas of greatest renewable 
resource reduce investment in renewable projects 
and maintain the high cost of the RO. 
CHP does not receive the same level of support that 
renewable generation does and needs to be located 
next to heat load rather than electricity demand. 
TNUoS charges thus have a larger impact on CHP 
projects than on renewable projects. Since CHP 
is a highly efficient technology when used in the 
right circumstances, any barriers to CHP should be 
identified and removed. 
Recommendation
 
• Government and Ofgem should review TNUoS 
charging arrangements for CHP generators 
and exempt CHP from the locational 
element, or provide additional support to CHP 
generators to meet the TNUoS charges.
The DNOs’ model for charging generators connected 
to the distribution networks also includes connection 
and use of system charges, although in this case, 
the use of system charge is based on voltage rather 
than location. 
Prior to 2005, the DNOs used a ‘deep’ connection 
charging methodology which meant that a 
single generator had to pay the full costs of all 
reinforcement work required for it to connect to 
the network. Other users, subsequently able to 
connect, did not contribute to the reinforcement 
costs. Ofgem recognised this could be a barrier to 
the development of distributed generation, and in 
the 2005 DPCR moved to a system of ‘shallower’ 
charging so that some of the reinforcement costs are 
spread over more users through a Generator Use of 
System charge. This change in charging methodology 
recognises the benefits of local generation. However, 
large power stations connected to the distribution 
network must also contract with National Grid and 
pay TNUoS charges.36 Smaller distribution connected 
generators benefit from both their avoided TNUoS 
and their contracted supplier’s avoided TNUoS. 
These charging arrangements are currently being 
reviewed. The Structure of Charges Implementation 
and Steering Group (replaced by the Distribution 
Charging Methodologies Forum in March 2007) 
looked at options for how distribution network 
charges will operate from 2010. Meanwhile the 
Transmission Access for Distributed Generation 
(TADG) Group has been assessing how generators 
connected to the distribution system should pay 
for the costs they may impose on the transmission 
system. It can be argued that because distributed 
generation avoids TNUoS charges this creates 
markets distortion. If the charges paid by distributed 
generation are not cost reflective, this may be 
inefficient and could lead to capacity constraints 
on the transmission network; and may encourage 
larger projects to connect to the distribution rather 
than transmission network. A move towards more 
cost-reflective pricing is likely to remove some of 
the commercial advantage of local generation.
Cost-reflective pricing is considered to be an 
important regulatory principle which creates clarity 
and consistency for investors. However, the costs used 
in the current charging models for both transmission 
and distribution only reflect economic costs and not 
wider environmental or social costs. At present, 
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Box 4  Charging arrangements for energy services companies
Urban Splash is the developer behind some of the UK’s most exciting urban regeneration projects. 
The company seeks to deliver innovative and contemporary solutions to living and working. This 
approach extends to the energy system: Urban Splash would like to offer consumers genuinely low 
carbon power, heating and cooling. To deliver this, it has developed a model which would allow 
energy suppliers to earn more in return for selling less to consumers. In this way Urban Splash 
believes it can shift the paradigm away from the traditional model of selling electricity and gas.
To do this Urban Splash sets itself up as an energy service company (ESCo) and guarantees the 
residents of its 300-flat developments power, heating and cooling distributed through its own 
wires. Part of this is generated on-site, for example through CHP or renewable technologies, and 
the remainder is provided by an energy supply company, and resold to residents. In some cases, 
several developments can be linked together and connected to the same local energy network. 
This is the case in Urban Splash’s Third Millennium Community Initiative in Manchester.
Residents pay a flat amount, calculated to be about 15 per cent lower than actual energy costs: 
around £100 per month at current prices. In return for the saving, residents give the ESCo the 
right to ensure that their property is as energy efficient as possible. As well as the fabric of the 
development, this might include providing a smart meter so that energy use can be tracked, and 
providing energy efficiency advice on a regular basis. Urban Splash is thus incentivised to ‘beat the 
market’ by ensuring the properties are as low carbon and energy efficient as possible.
The problem for Urban Splash has been that the structure of the existing energy market is not 
conducive to delivering its new business model. Rather, it is constantly being forced to adapt its 
model to comply with the requirements of what it sees as an antiquated, highly-regulated sector 
configured more to protect the incumbent energy companies than the consumers they serve. 
there is a misalignment between the principle of 
cost-reflective charging and the development of a 
sustainable energy system. 
Recommendation
 
• Ofgem to ensure any changes to the 
transmission charges paid by generators 
connected to the distribution network do not 
undermine the benefits that can be gained 
from clean local generation. 
The complexity of the charging arrangements may 
in itself be a barrier as it is difficult to determine the 
costs involved in connecting at a particular point, 
and how these costs change as other developments 
come forward. Small players do not have the 
resources to monitor developments in cost charging. 
This may be addressed through the current reviews 
of charging arrangements, although this process 
also places a disproportionate burden on small 
players. Ofgem is also considering the development 
of a web-based tool to address this issue. 
Recommendations	
• Ofgem to consider how the system of 
charging and process of reviewing charging 
arrangements could be improved to reflect 
better the interests of smaller generators
• Ofgem to require National Grid to develop a 
web tool that allows generators to see the 
cost implications for connecting in various 
areas of the grid in real time.
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Companies like Urban Splash have to negotiate with their incumbent DNO. (There are very few 
independent ones.) Yet the incentives on the network operators to incorporate and make use of 
low-carbon developments in the local network are weak. This, combined with high charges for 
using the system, puts developers like Urban Splash at a disadvantage in negotiations with the 
network operators and the terms that they receive are highly unfavourable.
In its Third Millennium Community Urban Splash will be distributing around 0.5 MW of electricity 
through a private electricity network. Because this is below the threshold of 2.5 MW, it is exempt 
from having to have a distribution licence, and so will not be required to provide open access to 
the network for suppliers, although it may choose to do so. 
Before one of its developments can be connected to the system, Urban Splash is required to pay 
around £1,000 per flat for network re-enforcement, a total of £300,000 for the development. The 
way this sum is calculated is not transparent and is based on the site’s requirement for stand-by 
power. Ofgem’s regime for demand connection, which it describes as ‘shallowish’, has remained 
broadly unchanged since 1994 and takes no account of environmental benefits. Typically, developers 
of domestic properties are required to fund the full cost of the single-phase service to each flat, the 
low voltage mains, the substation, the extension to the 11kV network and the 11kV joints to the 
existing network. If reinforcement is required at the voltage level above 11kV, then the developer 
will also need to meet 25 per cent of these costs. Where 132kV is being transformed directly to 
11kV the developer would have to pay for 132kV assets as well. 
Once connected to the system, developers of domestic properties must pay charges for using the 
distribution system. These so-called distribution use of system charges are imposed by Ofgem on 
the network operators as standard licence conditions. The objectives of the charging regime are to 
encourage competition and to adopt a cost-based approach to charging, but they do not explicitly 
mention sustainable development. Ofgem last consulted on these charges in May 2005, but did 
not propose then to include sustainable development in the objectives for the charging regime.
The charges are levied on the basis of both a ‘capacity’ and a ‘commodity’ element, with a 
significant element based on capacity. What this means in effect is that the charges are based on the 
maximum demand a site could have. This discriminates against sites with distributed generation, 
such as combined heat and power that do not often demand up to the maximum. One way to 
reverse this would be to levy all distribution charges on a purely commodity basis. This would not 
discriminate against sites with combined heat and power, would encourage energy efficiency and 
would better reflect the environmental costs associated with energy consumption. 
Finally, Urban Splash finds the restrictions on reselling electricity that it has bought from suppliers 
punitive. It is prevented from making any additional charges, despite the costs of running the local 
network and distributing the electricity. It therefore suffers a loss on the buying and reselling of 
electricity through its own networks. This is a further discouragement for companies such as Urban 
Splash to set up and run energy supply companies using their own local distribution networks.
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5.2.3 Electricity Transmission Connections
With the introduction of BETTA in 2005, the 
Scottish network became an integral part of the 
GB network. As part of this, generators are now 
expected to contract directly with the GBSO, and any 
connection offers made are conditional on necessary 
reinforcements across the whole of GB being in 
place. In anticipation of this, many generators 
submitted bids to be connected onto the grid but 
most of these did not have planning permission, 
which can take many years to achieve. 9.3GW of 
capacity is awaiting connection onto the grid in 
Scotland. This is known as the GB Queue. At the 
moment, connection into the transmission system 
is dependent on spare capacity being available, but 
an alternative approach could be taken. 
The issue of the GB Queue is compounded because 
the proposed major transmission line in Scotland, the 
Beauly-Denny line, is subject to planning appeals, as 
it will affect a large swathe of land through Scotland, 
including designated landscapes. Decisions on 
under-grounding have not yet been taken. Ofgem 
has contributed to the construction of new lines 
to connect generation in Scotland by introducing 
a flexible funding mechanism in the most recent 
Transmission Price Control. Ofgem has also held 
working group meetings to facilitate the shortening 
of the GB Queue and formed the Access Reform 
Option Development Group to review the options 
for transmission access. However, the outcomes 
of these working groups have not yet sufficiently 
influenced the Price Control Reviews. Industry 
participants have noted that without explicit support 
from Ofgem for the adoption of more innovative 
ways of reducing the queue, industry is unlikely to 
proceed as the need to improve efficiency (through 
RPI-X) is so strong in Ofgem’s Price Control Review 
processes.
In the light of the medium term need to further 
exploit the UK’s renewable energy resources, we 
believe that promising energy sources such as tidal 
power need to be included in future plans. The 
transmission system may need to be planned in a 
similar way to the original nuclear power station 
network. Exploitation of the significant energy 
generating potential of Pentland Firth, believed 
to be sufficient to contribute to around 3% of our 
electricity supply, will require grid strengthening to 
transmit the generated energy. 
Ofgem has been proactive in pushing government 
to agree a regulatory regime for the connection 
of offshore generation. The recent announcement 
to allow competitive tendering for offshore 
connections is welcome and should help ensure 
that new offshore networks are built quickly and 
cost-effectively. Most recently, Ofgem has released 
the principles for the offshore regime to connect 
generation in the Scottish islands.
Sustainable Development Commission Lost in Transmission 51
Box 5 Scottish Renewable Generation Connections
A 2001 Scottish Executive study concluded that there was sufficient renewable resource to provide 
59GW of capacity, or enough to meet up to 75% of the UK’s electricity needs. Of this, 46.5GW was 
from onshore wind, offshore wind, wave and tidal sources.37 However, while progress has been 
made developing new onshore wind farms in Scotland, much less progress has been made in 
offshore wind, wave or tidal technologies. 
In 2004, the Forum for Renewable Energy Development in Scotland – a joint industry-government 
group – reported that by 2020 up to 10% (1.3GW) of Scotland’s electricity needs could be met by 
wave and tidal sources, and that this would support the creation of 7,000 jobs in Scotland, but 
changes in policy and regulation were needed. There is significant tidal resource in the Pentland 
Firth alone, with a number of project sites that could cumulatively contribute around 3% to the UK 
generating mix.
Schemes are under development in Shetland, Orkney and the Western Isles which, if approved, 
would bring substantial revenue to these communities and make a major contribution to renewable 
electricity targets. However, Orkney and Western Isles only have lower capacity connections and 
Shetland has no connection to the mainland. Ofgem has been assessing alternative connection 
options to the islands, but there is growing concern that the timescale for any decision and provision 
of infrastructure is too long.
The current capacity constraints from this ‘invest then connect’ approach to transmission network 
operation create uncertainty around the connection date. This acts as a disincentive for investment 
decisions in offshore tidal projects in the Pentland Firth area.
National Grid has recently proposed a code amendment that would allow it to prioritise connection 
applications based on the projects’ ability to connect; if approved this could reduce the waiting 
times for connecting renewable generation. However, a move to a ‘connect then manage’ approach 
could see a more rapid increase in the connections of renewable generation. However, without 
the adoption of a ‘connect then manage’ approach to our network, and without more innovative 
approaches to connection and management, many renewables generators believe that long term 
prospects for growth may be stymied, and that companies will be forced to look oversees for better 
development opportunities. This would have serious implications for the UK’s ability to meet its 
European obligations on developing renewable energy.
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5.2.3.1	 	Adopting	a	‘connect	then	manage’	
approach
We think Ofgem could have a role in working around 
such delays in the transmission system upgrade, 
by supporting a ‘connect then manage’ approach. 
This proposal would entail the network operator, 
National Grid, connecting a generator to the grid 
as soon as the connection can physically be made, 
and then ‘dispatching’ (or permitting) them to use 
the grid in real time. Priority in the dispatch could 
be given to renewable generators, to maximise the 
low carbon element of the grid mix. With priority 
access for low carbon generation guaranteed in this 
way, the SDC believes there would be a significant 
increase in connection to the grid in the short 
term, and (coupled with our recommendation on 
embedding a carbon incentive into the Price Control 
Reviews, see below) much improved conditions 
for new renewables connections in the medium 
term. While Ofgem is reliant on proposals coming 
forward from industry for changes to the relevant 
codes to occur, it is our view that Ofgem missed an 
opportunity to signal a clear intention through the 
recent Transmission Price Control Review. 
Recommendation
• Ofgem should work with National Grid to 
develop a ‘connect then manage’ approach 
to the transmission network and prioritise the 
connection of low carbon generation.
We recognise that this approach will adversely affect 
high carbon electricity generators such as coal fired 
power stations, and that high carbon generators will 
be required to reduce their output to make space 
for the renewable generation capacity. However, in 
view of the UK’s overall carbon emission reduction 
goal, coupled with the Large Combustion Plants 
Directive and the recently agreed EU target for 20% 
renewables to be in the UK energy mix by 2020, this 
approach is consistent with UK energy policy and 
environmental goals. 
Alongside this, Ofgem and National Grid need to 
develop a standard methodology for calculating the 
carbon intensity (carbon per MWh) of all generation 
capacity, to form the basis for the priority access. 
The security standards for use of the transmission 
system should also be reviewed. At present 
transmission capacity is expected always to match 
or exceed generation capacity, so generators have 
to wait until the transmission network is upgraded 
before they can connect. The ‘connect then manage’ 
approach challenges this assumption as it allows 
renewable generation to use the backup/reserve 
capacity that exists in the transmission system (in 
case of faults on the grid). Should there be a fault 
elsewhere in the system, renewable generation 
would be disconnected while the fault was corrected. 
The number of recorded faults on the transmission 
system has been declining so this option would not 
pose a significant risk to the transmission network 
operator.
Potential	costs	and	carbon	savings	from	this	
recommendation
It is estimated that a one-off cost to National Grid of 
between £2M-£5M for setting up this system would 
be incurred, with ongoing costs to high-carbon 
generators who would be required to reduce their 
output as renewables generators come onto the 
system. It is estimated that this approach could save 
between 1.3 to 3.2MtC per year.38 
5.2.4	 Greenhouse	Gas	incentives	Package	in	
the	Price	Control	Reviews
The Price Control Reviews occur every five years 
and are the main interventions that Ofgem makes 
on all the networks. The TPCR covers both gas 
and electricity, and there are separate reviews in 
distribution for electricity and gas. The allowed levels 
of expenditure by the 14 electricity distribution 
networks, eight gas distribution network companies 
plus the transmission companies, are set in the price 
control reviews. This level of expenditure influences 
the costs that are passed onto the consumer. 
We have discussed elsewhere in this review the 
limitations of a five-yearly timeframe for long-
term planning of the networks, but we are here 
proposing an option to work within Ofgem’s 
existing regulatory framework to achieve improved 
outcomes for reducing the environmental impacts 
of the electricity and gas system. 
In the 2005 DPCR, Ofgem introduced three new 
incentives – for connecting DG, innovation and 
reducing losses. We believe these incentives are 
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important, and although they are showing only 
limited signs of having an impact (as the level at 
which they were set was conservative) we believe 
they can be significantly strengthened. 
We have examined a number of options39 for 
introducing a costing of greenhouse gases into 
Ofgem’s regulatory arrangements, including 
examining the option of introducing it into the overall 
calculations per company in the price control review 
process. We explored the possibility of adding a price 
of carbon onto the standard regulatory formula of RPI 
– X to allow network operators to charge for carbon, 
but we concluded that this amendment would not 
be workable as this formula applies to the whole of 
the company operating costs, and a carbon emission 
valuation is not applicable to all expenditure. We 
have therefore proposed a specific incentive for the 
transmission and distribution companies to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions on the system, supported 
by other strengthened incentives to reduce losses 
and promote innovation. 
Recommendation
 
• That Ofgem creates a Greenhouse Gas 
Incentive Package for use in the Distribution 
Price Control Reviews, as follows:
1. Strengthened incentives to reduce losses, 
either set at a level consistent with the 
current social cost of carbon (£80/tC) or the 
DNOs are required to purchase losses in the 
market, as is the case in gas distribution
2. Continuation of the existing incentive for 
distributed generation, but with specific 
increases in operational expenditure 
allowances to support the development of 
active management, to handle increasing 
two-way power flows and increasing 
proportions of distributed generation
3. Altering the IFI to raise the level of 
expenditure on innovation to levels closer to 
the UK average, and that overall innovation 
in systems and technologies is significantly 
increased 
4. Widening the scope for innovation in the RPZs 
(the areas where innovative solutions can 
be tested) from just connecting distributed 
generation, to including any innovative 
means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
The RPZ rules should be reviewed, as they 
currently limit the wider deployment of 
innovative technologies.
A similar package of measures should also be 
considered as part of the Transmission Price Control 
Review in order to ensure consistency of treatment 
for similar generators located in different parts of 
the UK. 
With the incentive at the right level, we believe a 
greenhouse gas incentive package would:
• encourage transmission and distribution 
companies to connect low carbon generation 
(also supported by the ‘connect then 
manage’ recommendation)
• stimulate the distribution networks and 
energy suppliers to encourage decentralised, 
renewable supply, and offer a fair price for 
electricity fed back into the grid.
5.2.5	 	Reducing	losses	from	the	electricity	
network
Electricity is lost as heat or noise and through 
theft on the networks as it is transported. At 
present losses from the GB system equate to 7% 
of electricity generating mix, equal to the yearly 
generating output of Drax, the UK’s largest power 
station at a capacity of 4GW. Ofgem estimates that 
‘a reduction in losses from the current level of 7% 
to 6% might contribute to 4% of the government’s 
target reductions in CO
2
 emissions by 2010 which 
equates to around 0.5MtC’.40 Overall losses from the 
system have fallen from 8% in 2000 to the current 
level of 7%. 
International comparison highlights that other 
European countries have loss levels substantially 
lower than the UK. In 2000, the level of losses from 
Finland was 3.7%, Netherlands 4.2%, Belgium 4.8% 
and Germany 5.1%.41 Although it should be noted 
that the geographical differences in these countries 
may explain some of the difference, it would appear 
that a goal for the UK of reducing losses to around 
4% would be viable. In our view, the UK should be 
aiming to achieve such a level, which could save 
up to 1.5MtC, depending on the type of generation 
displaced.
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The level of losses from a network depends on a 
number of factors; these include the nature of the 
equipment distributing the electricity (overhead 
lines, cables, etc); the geographic size of the area 
covered by the network; the voltage at which the 
generators are connected, the number of customers 
and generators connected to the network and 
the quantity and pattern of electricity distributed 
by the network. Some would argue that our 
recommendations to improve access of renewable 
generators onto the system from remote locations 
would increase UK losses; however losses from 
a carbon free source as a result of long distance 
transmission should be discounted as they do not 
contribute to increased greenhouse gas emissions. 
There are several measures that can be taken to 
manage losses to an efficient network; they include 
investment in low loss equipment, more effective 
network configuration, and management of demand 
during peak periods. 
In the 2005 DPCR, Ofgem introduced a losses 
incentive of £48/MWh of energy saved to encourage 
the network operators to invest in new systems 
and technologies for reducing losses. In its initial 
consultation on the level of the losses incentive, 
Ofgem proposed three options:
• improving and increasing the existing losses 
incentive
• changing the losses incentive to correspond 
to the system used by National Grid and
• requiring the distribution network operator to 
purchase electricity to replace that lost from 
their network.
The incentive adopted by Ofgem, to increase the 
existing incentive, in the 2005 Review was the 
weakest of these three options and it has not proved 
strong enough to make network operators invest 
in reducing technical losses. Instead the targets 
are largely being reached through reducing non-
technical losses (e.g. improving measurement of 
losses). While this is useful in itself, there continues 
to be a need to stimulate investment in low-loss 
equipment. There are a number of options for 
stimulating this investment:
• Increase the losses incentive to £82 per MWh 
(and continue to apply the incentive charge/
reward for five years after installation). The 
aim of this measure would be to strengthen 
incentives to reduce losses in the short term 
through ‘soft’ measures such as managing 
demand. This level of incentive implies a cost 
of carbon around £70/tC (2000 prices) and is 
consistent with the level DNOs suggest would 
have an impact on losses 
• Alternatively, Ofgem could require the DNOs 
to buy enough electricity in the market 
to cover the losses on the network. This 
would be consistent with the way the gas 
distribution networks have to buy gas to 
cover shrinkage (which includes losses from 
the gas network). While the wholesale 
electricity price will partially incorporate 
carbon costs through the EU ETS allowance 
price, the DPCR could include a mechanism to 
enhance the incentive on DNOs.
5.2.6  Facilitating the development of 
distributed generation
The strength of the distribution network is critical 
both for maintaining electricity supplies from 
centralised electricity generation (but with minimal 
losses), and supporting a more decentralised 
electricity network that could cope with increased 
levels of electricity sold back into the grid from 
small sources of generation (from community or 
household level).
The Energy Networks Association estimate that 
around ‘two thirds of the UK energy network is 
nearing the end of its design life and will need 
to be replaced sooner rather than later.’42 This is 
particularly critical in the light of the UK’s 2050 
carbon reduction targets, and the need to move 
towards complete decarbonisation of electricity 
supply. The recent EU agreement for 20% of energy 
supply to be from renewable sources by 2020 puts 
additional pressure on finding near-term solutions.
The distribution system today is largely passive, 
transporting energy from the transmission network 
to the demand source. At present the level of 
connected local generation (distributed generation) 
is relatively low at around 12GW, compared to a total 
generation capacity of around 80GW. Figure 6 shows 
the amount of DG in each network region, while 
Figure 7 shows the fuel mix for DG. Increasingly 
decentralised systems, such as those envisaged 
in London, and already operational in Woking, 
Southampton and Leicester, require improved 
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operation of the distribution systems to cope with 
the two-way flows of power. At significantly higher 
penetrations, technical changes to the network will 
be required. In future, the distribution networks will 
need to actively manage the flows of energy across 
the network so as to maximise the contribution 
that can be made from low carbon distributed 
generation. 
In addition to the need to strengthen the physical 
infrastructure, there needs to be a significant shift 
in the regulatory barriers and burdens that confront 
developers who wish to develop decentralised 
energy supply. In our view, and in the view of 
many commentators, the regulatory barriers 
are significantly slowing down development of 
decentralised supply, and this is not consistent with 
Ofgem’s own recent shift to support decentralised 
supply close to demand (for example, the 
Connection Charging regime). Regulatory barriers 
and electricity industry issues were identified in the 
joint DTI/Ofgem Distributed Generation review43 
and we welcome the announcement in the 2007 
Energy White Paper that Ofgem and government 
will consult on more flexible market and licensing 
arrangements for distributed generation.44
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The level of investment in the distribution networks 
has been approximately £1bn per annum. In 
the 2005 DPCR, Ofgem allowed a further £5.7bn 
to be spent between 2005-10. Of this capital 
expenditure, 35% is for new connections, 15.3% 
for reinforcement, 17.5% for substations, 11% for 
overhead lines, 7.5% for underground cables, and 
12.8% for other activities.45 The reliability of the 
network has improved since privatisation, mirroring 
the increase in expenditure allowed at each DPCR.
Ofgem has committed to creating scenarios for 
the development of the networks to aid future 
investment plans. The scenarios will outline how 
the networks might deal with different levels of 
penetration of local and remote generation.
The 2005 DPCR included an incentive to connect DG. 
At present the DG incentive is set at £2.50 per kWh 
of DG connected each year. However work done by 
United Utilities in association with the University of 
Sussex shows that the level of the incentive may 
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not be strong enough to compensate for the loss of 
revenue the DNO will face as a result of the loss of 
through-put on the distribution network. While this 
work is still at an early stage, it suggests that the 
DG incentive may not be as effective as it could be 
because the overall RPI-X framework is so tight. The 
DG incentive will need to be strengthened if it is to 
encourage the connection of DG by the DNOs. 
Recommendation	
• Ofgem should analyse the work being done 
by United Utilities and the University of 
Sussex and, if it finds the conclusions to be 
valid, adjust the DG incentive accordingly.
5.2.7 Amending the Innovation Incentive
Innovation capacity in the industry has been severely 
affected by the reduction in investment over the 
past decade. 
In the 2005 DPCR, Ofgem introduced an innovation 
incentive to reverse this trend. The IFI allowed 
companies to spend 0.5% of turnover (approximately 
£1-2 million) on innovation over the next five years. 
In February 2007, this was extended to 2015 to 
improve longer term certainty. While this is a 
welcome measure it is worth noting that the level 
of innovation funding is small compared to levels 
of innovation spend in other sectors. The low levels 
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of innovation funding in the sector over the past 
decade have led to noticeable skill shortages in the 
industry. The incentive will help to overcome this 
under-investment, but in our view it is not strong 
enough to stimulate real change quickly enough.
However, innovation is more than just research and 
development: it is also the commercialisation and 
deployment of innovative ideas. A recent EU survey 
of energy R&D projects revealed that 89% of R&D 
projects delivered new knowledge and patents, but 
fewer than 15% resulted in commercialisation. This 
is especially true for regulated industries where 
there is no consumer pull for innovation (in contrast 
to the telecoms or pharmaceutical industries). In the 
light of this, regulators can often take the short term 
view and consider innovation, with its high failure 
rate, to be a poor use of consumers’ money. We 
understand that Ofgem is particularly reluctant to 
‘micro-manage’ the network companies, with some 
in the organisation believing the regulator should 
not be involved in intervening in this one area of 
network activity. 
5.2.8	 Registered	Power	Zones
To support commercialisation and deployment of 
innovative ideas, Ofgem created RPZs. The RPZs 
particularly support the connection of DG, and 
operators receive a tripled incentive if DG and 
innovation are combined. However this restriction 
to DG does not incentivise mass rollout because 
innovative solutions are rarely ready to be 
commercially viable, and therefore do not feature 
in operators’ normal operations in the Price Control 
Reviews. There is a need to maintain support 
for innovative solutions beyond the initial first 
demonstration phase. 
The 2006 Better Regulation Commission Annual 
Report46 highlights the relationship between 
innovation and regulation. It points out that in 
many cases poorly considered regulation can stifle 
innovation as it leads to mandated conformity 
rather than new ideas. The report recommends 
simplification of the regulatory regime to enable 
regulated companies to innovate. It further notes 
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that regulating minimum permitted standards can 
promote environmental innovation. For Ofgem, this 
could mean setting a limit on losses from network 
assets, and implementing incentives that are strong 
enough to promote innovative new solutions.
Recommendations
• That Ofgem increases innovation funding for 
the network companies
• That the scope of the innovation funding is 
broadened to cover any innovative solution 
that reduces greenhouse gas emissions.
Strong society  
and sustainable 
economy
How is Ofgem addressing  
social and economic  
concerns?
6
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Box 6  Decoupling Energy Demand: The California experience
The oil price shocks of the 1970s forced policy-makers to confront the growing levels of energy use in 
the State of California. They recognised that expecting energy companies to sell less energy to their 
consumers was counter-intuitive in a capitalist economy. They therefore needed to come up with a 
policy designed to ‘decouple’ the financial health of the energy companies from the amount of energy 
they sold by implementing rigid Price Control Reviews every few years. These Price Control Reviews 
allow the companies to recover their costs based on a realistic forecast of sales. 
The decoupling approach allowed energy companies to be rewarded for investing in energy efficiency 
improvements and achieving greater resource productivity. But it did not sit well alongside a policy 
of deregulation designed to promote competition and investment in the energy sector. Some even 
consider that decoupling was partly responsible for the blackouts in 2001, since retailers were unable 
to respond to the electricity generation price spikes by raising prices for consumers. While energy 
retailers in California continue to be tightly regulated, the ‘decoupling’ approach as such has largely 
been abandoned.
Since the blackouts in 2001 the State of California has pursued a range of other policies specifically 
designed to limit demand, increase efficiency and increase the proportion of renewables in the fuel 
mix. In 2001 the State invested $1 billion to incentivise domestic consumers to replace eight million 
lightbulbs with compact fluorescents; cities and towns installed LED traffic lights; and factories replaced 
old motors with new, more efficient ones. The result of the investment programme was a reduction in 
demand of 5,000 MW in one year, equivalent to the output of five large generating plants and enough 
to meet the daily demand from Los Angeles. 
This approach was developed into a long-term state energy policy in 2003. At that time, the State 
regulator and other institutions jointly introduced the Energy Action Plan (EAP) as the way to implement 
California’s energy policy objectives. The EAP proposes a hierarchy of options for meeting California’s 
energy needs. They are designed to guide agencies’ decisions: ‘first acquire cost-effective energy 
efficiency and demand response, followed by distributed generation and renewable resources, and 
finally, clean fossil fuel power plants’. The three major electricity utilities are authorised to enter into 
long- and short-term contracts with their electricity customers in line with the EAP hierarchy. 
The Sustainable Consumption Roundtable’s report 
Seeing the Light47 noted that micro-generation was 
an effective way of connecting consumers with their 
energy use and that once installed, micro-generators 
stimulate a change in consumer behaviour to reduce 
overall consumption.
A regulatory approach should adapt to the 
need to curb demand. Competition will not be just 
for reducing the price of energy in terms of pence 
per kilowatt hour, but also seen in terms of offers 
to consumers. A Supplier Obligation modelled 
on an approach which caps energy sales, as we 
are suggesting, would be more about the energy 
services provided to consumers, and not just the 
unit cost.
Our recommendation for the framework of energy policy is for a shift from a sole focus on energy supply 
to one that combines security of supply with demand reduction through an energy service approach. 
The introduction of a Supplier Obligation in 2012 is the opportunity to effect this transformation. 
Between now and 2012 there must be increased effort to promote consumer awareness of energy use 
through improved billing information and the introduction of smart metering.
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The specific actions within the hierarchy include for example: energy retailers adopting a voluntary 
dynamic pricing system designed to reduce peak demand by 1,500 to 2,000 megawatts by 2007; 
providing customer incentives for energy demand reduction; and providing utilities with demand 
response and energy efficiency investment rewards comparable to the return on investment in new 
power and transmission projects. These show the paramount importance attached to demand reduction 
in a State where peak demand is largely driven by air conditioning during the summer, and a quarter of 
capacity is used for less than 100 hours a year.
Smart meters are being seen as key to demand reduction in California, particularly when combined 
with financial and environmental incentives for companies, municipalities, hospitals and universities to 
reduce their demand at peak times. A State-wide trial in 2003/4 aimed to test the advantages for all 
consumers from the greater freedom that smart metering gives them over their energy usage. The trial 
found that, where societal benefits were added to the operational benefits, the cost benefit case was 
positive, even for smaller consumers. Based on these results, the regulator has agreed that by 2011 all 
commercial and residential consumers will have smart meters installed. They will pay a surcharge of 
$0.5 – $1 for five years. 
As a result, compared with the rest of the United States where energy use and carbon emissions have 
risen over the period, California has managed to become one of the least energy- and carbon-intensive 
states. While energy use per person in the US as a whole has increased by 45 per cent over the last 30 
years, California’s per capita use has remained relatively flat. Gross greenhouse gas emissions in California 
increased about one per cent from 1990 to 1999. The increase is much lower than for the US as a whole 
where emissions increased 12 per cent over the same period. California will also establish the first US cap 
on greenhouse gas emissions in a plan to reduce the State’s emissions by 25 per cent by 2020. 
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Per capita electricity sales
Much of the credit for this should go to the California energy regulator which has had a significant and 
long-term role in the energy market, alongside the Energy Commission, the Consumer Energy Center 
and the Governor’s Office. The regulator has used its legal discretion to interpret its general duties to 
protect consumers to include the promotion of a sustainable energy policy. The result has been that the 
regulator has taken an active role in promoting energy efficiency and renewable energy even when this 
has meant large amounts of consumers’ money being spent. This example of joint working shows how 
different institutions can achieve effective outcomes if their aims and objectives are clearly aligned.
Source: California Public Utilities Commission
Figure 9  Per Capita Electricity Sales
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In addition to the change in policy approach that we 
envisage from 2012 with the Supplier Obligation, 
there is more that Ofgem could do now to facilitate 
much greater consumer engagement with the use 
of energy. As emissions of CO
2
 and levels of energy 
use continue to rise, despite efforts on energy 
efficiency, there needs to be much greater consumer 
understanding about energy use, its impacts and 
ways in which to reduce these impacts. Information 
is key to building this understanding, and Ofgem’s 
role is important. 
In this section we look at the contribution Ofgem 
could make to help consumers manage their bills:
• the introduction of improved meters, 
particularly for use with micro-generation
• the different tariffs that exist, and how these 
could be improved for low-income consumers
• Ofgem’s current practice of encouraging 
supplier switching, as the principal 
mechanism for consumers to achieve lower 
energy prices, and whether this is a successful 
approach.
6.1  Engaging consumers with energy use
There is little prospect of meeting the government’s 
goal of reducing emissions by 60% or more unless 
consumers take active responsibility for their energy 
management. Improving people’s engagement 
with their energy use can be done in a number 
of ways and is critical to influencing behaviour to 
reduce demand. 
6.1.1 Energy bills
The energy bills that consumers receive are an 
important way of informing households about 
their energy use. Research by the Environmental 
Change Institute found that feedback, both direct 
and indirect, can provide an impetus for reducing 
energy use. Furthermore, persistent feedback 
appears to promote persistent reductions in energy 
use.48 This research highlighted that consumers 
were most receptive to the provision of historical 
analysis on the energy bills with less consumer 
acceptance for benchmarking consumption against 
other households.
Research carried out in Stavanger in Norway studied 
the effects of requiring households to send their 
electricity and meter readings to their utility company 
regularly in return for a very comprehensive bill 
which was easy to understand. Three years after 
the trial started the households in the study were 
consuming eight per cent less electricity than the 
general population.49
Estimated bills
At present, one in three energy bills provided to 
domestic consumers are estimated.50 Estimated bills 
are in integral part of the industry’s billing practices. 
However, the benefits of providing historical 
information are undermined given that estimated 
bills are themselves based on historical consumption 
information, which may also be estimated. 
It is therefore unlikely that bar charts based on 
estimated bills will show any change in the level of 
consumption over the previous year, undermining 
the impact of energy efficiency messages.
Even where the bill is based on an accurate meter 
reading, the information is provided in terms of 
kilowatt hours, for both electricity and gas. This 
is a unit that is not readily understood by to most 
consumers.51 
A standard billing format could allow consumers 
more easily to compare the products on offer 
from supplier companies, and increase the level of 
switching in the market.
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Box 7  Billing super-complaint
In 2005 Energywatch made a super-complaint to Ofgem on the energy market’s standard of billing, 
stating that Energywatch receives around 70,000 complaints and enquiries relating to billing and 
account management each year. However, it should be borne in mind that many consumers may 
not be aware of the existence of Energywatch, so do not make a complaint and in addition, 
many consumers may be prepared to tolerate a fairly high level of dissatisfaction before making a 
complaint to Energywatch. In the super-complaint, Energywatch indicated that approximately one-
third of customers contact their supplier to query their bill or account every quarter. 
Ofgem note that of the 200 million bills sent out each year the number of complaints to Energywatch 
is equivalent to a monthly average of 0.07 per 1000 consumers. However, this is six times the rate 
of complaints about domestic telephone lines, and is rising, whereas in the telecommunications 
sector rates of complaint are stable. In the water sector, the Consumer Council for Water received 
6704 complaints about metering and billing from consumers in England and Wales in 2006/07.52 
Figure 10  Complaints relating to billing practices in the telecommunications and energy markets
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In response to the billing super-complaint, Ofgem asked suppliers to establish and finance an 
independent dispute resolution body, the ‘billing ombudsman’, to revolve any billing complaints 
that could not be resolved with the supplier. Ofgem also requires suppliers, from July 2007, to stop 
seeking payment from customers where a supplier has failed to bill for over 12 months.
The Energy Retail Association (ERA) agreed to draw up a billing code of conduct with industry 
participants. The work done by ERA in creating a supplier billing code of practice is a positive step 
to addressing these issues. However the SDC would like to see the code complete the Office of Fair 
Trading’s accreditation process under the Consumer Code Approval Scheme.
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Evidence from Sweden53 suggests that by mandating 
accurate monthly bills the business case for supply 
companies installing smart meters becomes positive 
and has resulted in a mass rollout of smart meters. 
The Energy Review concluded that the provision 
of historic information alone could save 0.1MtC/yr 
by 2020. 
Improvements to industry practice for metering 
and billing opens up the potential for a range of 
new technological advancements which could 
simultaneously work to achieve both social and 
environmental objectives. Smart metering could lead 
to developments in a number of areas, including:
• Micro-generation - more accurate calculation 
of exported electricity could improve 
the business case for micro-generation 
technologies
• Time of day tariffs – meters that are capable 
of recognising energy demand at different 
times of the day could lead to innovative 
tariff structures that reward consumers for 
using energy during off peak periods, thus 
reducing demand and greenhouse gas 
emissions during peak periods. Such tariffs 
would be an extension of the already existing 
economy 7 tariffs, which require a different 
meter at present
• Dynamic demand appliances – household 
appliances could be fitted with devices that 
communicate with the meter to reduce 
demand at various points in the day; such 
devices would tie in with time of day tariffs.
The combination of smart metering with more active 
management of the networks could ultimately 
result in a more information rich energy system that 
could match the characteristics of different types of 
generation with different consumer demand profiles.
Options for change
Ofgem could address these issues in the short term 
by working with the Energy Retail Association to 
include energy efficiency information in the revised 
Code of Practice for Accurate Bills. The revised 
Code could then apply to all consumers (domestic, 
commercial and industrial) not subject to half hourly 
metering. However, the revised code of practice 
is likely to remain a voluntary agreement. In the 
longer term, Ofgem could mandate suppliers to take 
action by amending the electricity and gas supply 
licences to incorporate improved billing, should 
the metering and billing trials provide evidence to 
support such an intervention. 
Changes to the supply licences could follow a similar 
theme to EEC and the proposed cap and trade 
scheme. Ofgem could set minimum standards and 
suppliers could then be encouraged to come up 
with innovative ways of presenting the information. 
This link could be taken a step further by allowing 
suppliers to claim EEC credits if the information 
meets Ofgem’s minimum standards. Ultimately, if a 
cap and trade scheme is implemented it will be in 
the suppliers’ interests to encourage consumers to 
manage their own demand. 
The minimum standard for bills could include the 
following features:
• Accurate monthly bills so customers receive 
regular feedback regarding their energy use 
and see evidence of the reduction in energy 
usage following the implementation of 
energy efficiency measures
• A graphical comparison between current 
and historic gas and electricity use in that 
dwelling.
• Fuel source disclosure on a tariff basis so that 
customers receive an accurate picture of the 
environmental impact of their energy use.
6.1.2 Smart meters 
The EU Energy End Use Efficiency and Energy 
Services Directive (2006/32/EC) (also known as the 
Energy Services Directive) requires the installation 
of new and replacement meters which measure the 
actual time of use, subject to financial and technical 
feasibility, and for energy suppliers to provide 
accurate bills that enable customers to make 
informed choices about energy use. In addition, 
the mass installations of more innovative meters in 
countries such as Italy, Sweden, USA, Canada and 
Australia have highlighted what could be achieved 
in the UK if a similar installation scheme were 
introduced. In recognition of the Energy Services 
Directive, the government announced in the 
Energy White Paper 2007 a commitment to require 
supply companies to provide real time displays to 
consumers on demand from January 2008. 
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Whilst these are not smart meters and therefore 
do not allow for the innovative solutions described 
above, there is evidence to suggest that they could 
help change consumer behaviour and ultimately 
lead to a reduction in energy use. It is also worth 
noting that there can be innovative ways of keeping 
energy users informed of their current energy usage, 
by techniques such as a continuous information 
point on an individual’s computer. Improvements in 
information technology should be creatively linked 
to metering.
The need for accurate usage information should be 
seen in conjunction with the rising profile of the role 
that micro-generation can play in delivering a more 
secure and sustainable energy system. In addition 
rising household energy bills have made the issue 
of metering and billing very important.
Ofgem’s	work	
Ofgem is working with government to trial 
innovative billing and metering arrangements. 
These trials, which have only recently started, 
should conclude in 2009 and will provide important 
UK-specific evidence on the impact better billing and 
metering could have. As part of this process Ofgem 
has consulted on the benefits of smart metering.
The Climate Change and Sustainable Energy Act 
2005 placed an obligation on supply companies to 
provide tariffs to micro-generators for the sale of 
exported electricity. Supply companies have until 
2008 to provide these tariffs; however, should they 
be inadequate Ofgem and the government will 
intervene. In addition, Ofgem could help to reduce 
the number of estimated bills sent to consumers, 
and thus be more actively engaged with energy use. 
Ofgem’s consultation on smart metering outlined 
the potential for metering innovation to overcome 
this barrier.
Ofgem noted that there were four types of smart 
meter
• Automated Meter Reading (AMR) allows for 
one way communication with the meter. This 
means that the meter can be read remotely, 
which allows the supplier to provide bills 
based on actual rather than estimated 
readings
• Automated Meter Management (AMM) 
allows for two way communication meaning 
that the supply company would not only be 
able to read the meter remotely, but also 
change energy prices and tariffs without the 
need to visit the customers home to manually 
re-set the meter
• Interval metering with AMM which allows 
for two way communication but also records 
more information on energy use, e.g. on a 
half-hourly basis. This information would 
allow supply companies to offer time-of-day 
tariffs where consumers could use energy 
outside peak time. This would also allow 
energy using appliances to include dynamic 
demand controls which would activate 
household appliances during low cost periods
• Pre-payment meters (PPM) could include 
better information and displays to allow 
consumers to budget for their energy use.
The potential for smart metering to improve the 
level of consumer engagement with the energy 
system is immense. Ofgem concludes that smart 
meters could cost between £30 to £150, depending 
on the type of meter, which covers the costs of the 
meter, installation, (potential) stranding and the 
systems costs necessary to retrieve and process the 
data from the meters.
However, many industry participants have 
commented that the decision to promote 
competition in the metering market has led to a 
very complex set of arrangements with numerous 
industry participants involved in the innovation 
process. One Chief Executive Officer stated that the 
decision to promote competition in metering was 
‘competition for competition’s sake’. The market 
may well arrive at smart metering solutions but 
over a longer time frame than if metering was the 
responsibility of network operators. Competition in 
metering was introduced in 2003 so it is too early 
to tell if competition in the metering markets will 
be a success, but Ofgem needs to ensure that the 
arrangements will result in a swift uptake of smart 
meters should the trials support a policy intervention 
in this area.
The innovations in metering technology could allow 
for innovation in customer bills and, ultimately 
improvements in the quality of information 
provided. Research carried out for Ofgem by the 
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Centre for Sustainable Energy (CSE)54 found that 
there was a high degree of acceptance for including 
historical consumption information on bills which 
resulted in changing consumption patterns. The 
research also showed a lower level of acceptance 
for other forms of benchmarking, for example 
against neighbours’ consumption levels. Metering 
of water use is also gradually increasing, and there 
could be opportunities for multi-metering to cover 
all utilities.
Recommendation
• We recommend that Ofgem responds rapidly 
once the billing and metering trials are 
complete though a combination of improving 
the frequency and accuracy of bills and a roll-
out of smart meters
6.1.3	 Microgeneration	
The Sustainable Consumption Roundtable found that 
Consumers who generate their own electricity and 
heat with micro-generation are noticeably better 
engaged with broader energy management and 
other environmental issues.55 It seems that micro-
generation provides a tangible hook to engage 
householders with the issue of energy use. At 
present, the percentage of the total generating mix 
that is supplied by micro-generation is less than 1%.
There are noticeable barriers to increasing the level 
of penetration of micro-generation technologies. 
These are:
• Overall project costs, including the costs 
associated with the technology purchase, 
metering and operation
• The difficulty of selling surplus generation 
to the grid, as main suppliers do not offer 
export tariffs and those that do often charge 
a higher price for electricity purchased
• The complexity of claiming Renewable 
Obligation Certificates (ROCs) and the delay in 
receiving payment for ROCs 
• Perception and awareness of the technologies 
and what benefits can be achieved
• Practical issues such as planning permission, 
although government is now proposing to tackle 
this through the new Planning White Paper.
Ofgem is already undertaking work announced by 
the Chancellor in the 2007 Budget to look at whether 
microgenerators receive a fair reward for energy 
exports. Other measures, beyond the price received 
for exported electricity, may also be important in 
supporting the development of microgeneration. 
Options for further Ofgem work:
• In some instances it may be more cost 
effective to install micro-generation than to 
extend the distribution network. Network 
extension options could be an opportunity 
for micro-generation companies to offer an 
alternative service
• A stronger Losses Incentive could incentivise 
the DNOs to offer lower connection tariffs to 
consumers with micro-generation.
6.2 Improved Tariff Structures 
Since privatisation of the energy markets, consumers 
have had more choice over their supplier, tariff 
and payment options. Consumers can now choose 
different types of tariff such as green tariffs, dual 
fuel tariffs and economy 7 tariffs as well as different 
payment options such as standard credit, direct 
debit and pre-payment. Consumers can also opt to 
pay their bills monthly, quarterly or biannually.
Green Tariffs
Research by Powergen56 and the National Consumer 
Council57 shows considerable support for ‘green’ 
sources of energy, but not necessarily a willingness 
to pay a premium for it. To date only 200,000 
customers have switched to a green tariff.58 
The 2006 NCC report found that ‘many green tariffs 
are not delivering the environmental benefits they 
claim. As a result consumers may not be making 
the positive contribution they think they are.’ 
Independent accreditation of green tariffs is a pre-
requisite if consumers are to be confident that they 
are making a genuine contribution to reducing 
emissions. 
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Green electricity tariffs vary between suppliers but 
typically fall into three main categories:
• Green electricity supply tariff, where the 
supplier guarantees that the electricity it sells 
is from renewable sources
• Green energy fund tariff, where the supplier 
invests the premium paid by consumers into 
new renewable or environmental projects
• A carbon offset tariff, where suppliers offer 
to offset the CO
2
 emitted by the consumers 
by planting trees or investing in other CO
2
 
reducing projects.
Ofgem set out guidance on green tariffs in 200259 
and is currently reviewing it prior to issuing renewed 
guidance later in 2007.60 Ofgem is working with the 
Energy Saving Trust on a rating system for green 
tariffs which is currently out to consultation.
Options for action by Ofgem:
• Ofgem could amend the supply licence so 
that suppliers are mandated to sign up to the 
green supply guidelines (i.e. they effectively 
become regulations rather than guidelines) if 
they wish to offer green tariffs.
• Ofgem could also oblige electricity suppliers 
offering green tariffs to:
 –  Produce an individual fuel mix disclosure 
chart for each of their green tariffs 
set within the context of their overall 
generation mix 
 –  Calculate the declared amount of CO
2
 
reduction that will be achieved from 
swapping to a green tariff from a 
conventional variety 
 –  Have their green tariffs independently 
audited each year against a benchmark set 
by Ofgem. This is a low cost measure that 
will provide a level of confidence for the 
consumers.
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Figure 11 Total number of fuel poor and vulnerable customers
6.3  Improved treatment of low income and vulnerable customers
A fuel poor household is one that spends more than 
10% of income on energy bills. The UK Government 
and the DAs have stated their commitment to end 
the problem of fuel poverty. In England, the target 
is to seek an end to fuel poverty for vulnerable 
households by 2010 and an end to fuel poverty 
altogether by 2016. In Scotland, the overall objective 
is to ensure an end to fuel poverty by 2016, whilst 
in Wales the target date is 2018.
Ofgem has a duty to protect the interests of 
individuals who are disabled, or chronically sick, of 
pensionable age, with low incomes, or residing in 
rural areas. It should be noted that the terms low-
income consumers and fuel poor consumers cannot 
be used interchangeably. The low-income group is 
rather broader but does encompass the fuel poor 
and Ofgem may have regard to other descriptions of 
consumers outside of those expressed in its duties.
As Figure 11 shows, the number of people in fuel 
poverty has increased over the last three years. 
The Fuel Poverty Advisory Group (FPAG) 5th annual 
report highlights that energy prices rose 50% 
between 2004 and 200661 and the graph above 
shows that this increase in prices pushed two million 
consumers into fuel poverty.62 Action taken to raise 
income levels and energy efficiency measures 
installed in housing, have reduced this figure by 0.3 
million. However, FPAG projects that by the end of 
2007, 2.5 millions households will be in fuel poverty 
in England, twice as many as in 2004, largely as a 
result of increased retail prices for energy.
6.3.1 How is fuel poverty being combated?
Currently, fuel poverty initiatives are focused on 
three areas:
• raising household income levels. Government 
provides income support through provisions 
such as tax credits, pension credits and 
Winter Fuel Payments to assist low income 
households 
• improving the energy efficiency of the home 
to reduce energy demand, and
• reducing energy prices.
Energy efficiency measures are installed through 
two programmes: the EEC and government’s Warm 
Front programme (and Warm Deal in Scotland, 
Warm Homes in Wales) provide energy efficiency 
measures and heating to those on low incomes, 
with expenditure exceeding £600 million between 
2005-2008. EEC programmes include a provision for 
50% of effort to be targeted to the ‘priority group’ 
of low income consumers, who receive energy 
efficiency measures from their supply companies. 
Ofgem, in administering EEC, contributes to the 
success of this mechanism, although the policy is 
developed by government.
A third means of combating fuel poverty is by 
focussing on the price of energy paid by low income 
and vulnerable consumers. The downward pressure 
on prices through competition and Ofgem’s role 
in maintaining this has benefited low income 
and vulnerable consumers, as has the availability 
of different payment options. Energy supply 
companies’ social responsibility schemes are also 
becoming increasingly important.
6.3.2 How should fuel poverty be combated?
Over the short to medium term the existing fuel 
poverty measures are aimed in the right direction, 
with a focus on income, energy efficiency and price. 
As the FPAG report suggests there is potential for 
fuel poverty benefits to be achieved by increasing 
the level of funding to fuel poverty schemes such as 
EEC and Warm Front. Evidence from Northern Ireland 
suggests that smart meters could also play a role.
In the short-term, an examination of the energy 
tariffs for low income customers would be welcome. 
In the longer term, a more sustainable solution 
would be to protect vulnerable customers from 
prices rises by reducing their demand. This could 
be done by installing energy efficiency measures 
and through micro-generation (or community scale) 
technologies in buildings. 
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Box 8 Keypad meters: the experience in Northern Ireland
During the 1980s the pre-payment metering stock in Northern Ireland was largely based on coin 
meters but had gradually changed to card meters by the start of 1990. Several problems persisted 
with pre-payment despite the change to card meters. These were:
• the stigma for low income families being on pre-payment meters
• the annual meter charge
• costs to NIE of tracking and reconciling usage and statements
• the costs to NIE of servicing the meters
• high levels of fraud
• high levels of complaints arising from prepayment meters.
These problems led to a trial in 1998 of new pay-as-you-go technology developed by PRI and used 
extensively in Soweto in South Africa. Customers pre-pay for electricity using a card. Each time they 
pre-pay they receive a dedicated code which they key into their meter. The code will not work in 
any other meter. First, customer acceptance was tested in focus groups. Then the keypad meters 
themselves were tested in 200 homes. The research and the trials were very successful. This pilot 
study showed a reduction in electricity demand of 11 per cent compared with homes without 
keypad meters
As a result Northern Ireland Electricity (NIE) and the energy regulator for Northern Ireland agreed 
in 1999 that keypad meters should be introduced into Northern Ireland, initially with the aim of 
replacing all existing pre-payment metering stock. Although keypad meters are capable of two-
way communication, the model chosen had lower technical specifications. Each meter cost around 
£40, more than the existing card meters which cost around £35 and considerably more than 
the standard credit meters which cost only around £10. Northern Ireland Electricity was allowed 
through its price control agreement to pass through to its customer base half of the up-front costs 
of the keypad meters. Subsequently the regulator agreed that up to 200,000 keypad meters could 
be introduced.
The benefits for customers from keypad meters can be summed up as follows:
• electricity at a discount of 2.5 per cent compared with standard credit
• free installation
• easy-to-read real time and historical usage displays allow for reduced consumption
• no self-disconnection at nights, weekends and fixed bank holidays
• no bills
• no lost tokens
• vending options between £2 and £175
• large choice of vending outlets and 24/7 telephone vending facility
• option to pay by cash or debit card
•  cheaper electricity tariffs at off-peak times of the day 
 (for Powershift or Economy 7 tariff options).
The success of keypad meters has been phenomenal. To date, 192,250 homes have a keypad 
meter installed, or over a quarter of all homes in Northern Ireland. Demand has been driven by 
word of mouth. This level of uptake has extended well beyond the original prepayment base, with 
demand for pay-as-you-go proving very strong among households on standard credit. Consumer 
satisfaction surveys consistently show high levels of satisfaction.
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There have been several attempts to measure the actual reduction in electricity demand as a 
result of keypad meters. Since households are paying for the electricity in advance, they are giving 
greater thought as to how much electricity they will need to use; and since regular small top-ups 
are being made to the credit, consumers will be observing more closely how much electricity they 
are actually using. The meter also provides both real time and historical usage information.
In 2003, NIE carried out an in-depth investigation of a random sample of some 30 households that 
were formerly standard credit customers and had had a keypad meter for at least a year. Their 
consumption history for the year before and after the installation showed a reduction in electricity 
demand in real terms of 4 per cent. This was lower than the 11 per cent reduction suggested by 
the trial during the pilot phase, but was a more rigorous and long-term investigation. It remains 
important to understand whether initial reductions in electricity demand are sustained over longer 
periods, and NIE are carrying out further work on this during the next few months.
In 2005, NIE looked at how households with keypad meters reacted to a ‘time of day’ tariff that 
offered them low, medium and high priced electricity at different times of the day. A random 
sample of 200 households was selected. 100 households were provided with the ‘time of day’ 
tariff, while the other 100 were the control group. Over half of the households surveyed reduced 
their electricity demand at peak times thereby making financial savings of 0 – 3 per cent, while 
one fifth of the households made financial savings of 5 – 10 per cent. Further analysis showed that 
these households typically were made up of 2 to 4 people living in a detached house. Overall, the 
trial showed a perceptible reduction in demand at peak times of 1.7 MW when extrapolated, and 
household savings of £0.5 million over a year. The trial did not find evidence of overall electricity 
demand reductions.
As a result of the trial NIE introduced the ‘time of day tariff’ to certain households in 2005.  
They now plan a major trial with the University of Ulster to test the potential of a combination of 
keypad meters and energy saving advice to reduce electricity demand more rigorously. The trial 
will run over the next two years, with results available in 2009.
In 1999, Ofgem included provisions in supply 
licences requiring supply companies to offer a range 
of payment methods and stipulating the amount 
that companies could recoup from consumers in 
repayment of debt. Around this time Ofgem also 
facilitated the establishment of the Priority Service 
Register (PSR) which requires supply companies to 
provide additional support to vulnerable households 
through, for example, better location of meters (so 
use is more apparent) or provisions to send bills 
to other family members. These provisions also 
require supply companies to install a pre-payment 
meter before disconnecting a consumer. Ofgem has 
agreed to keep these social provisions in the most 
recent review of supply licences.
Ofgem has focused on reducing the cost of energy 
for vulnerable consumers by promoting competition. 
Part of this approach involves informing low income 
consumers of the benefits of switching through 
the EnergySmart campaign but has also included 
research to investigate consumer attitudes to 
prepayment meters. Another strand to the strategy 
promotes corporate social responsibility between 
energy suppliers. To date supply companies have 
spent around £110 million on CSR related schemes.
6.3.3  What has Ofgem done to protect the interests of low income and vulnerable consumers?
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Table 2: Difference between tariffs for different payment methods by supplier
Gas Electricity
Supplier Prepayment	
bill
% difference 
to standard 
credit
% difference 
to direct 
debit
Prepayment	
bill
% difference 
to standard 
credit
% difference 
to direct 
debit
British Gas £636 8.5 21.1 £399 4.5 9.6
EDFE £650 1.4 4.2 £357 0.0 2.3
npower £582 9.4 13.9 £435 15.7 22.5
Powergen £615 13.7 17.4 £384 3.2 6.4
Scottish 
Power
£629 1.1 6.4 £379 0.0 14.2
SSE £578 8.4 15.4 £355 0.0 6.3
Average 
across GB
£615 6.8 12.6 £385 4.0 10.2
Source: Energywatch
Customers who are offered pre-payment meters as 
an alternative to disconnection face higher energy 
costs as a result. The FPAG noted that the difference 
in annual cost between consumers on pre-payment 
meters and direct debit was as much as £120 in 2006, 
up from £70 in 2004 as shown in the table 1.63
Table 1: Difference between average direct debit (DD) and pre-payment (PP) tariffs
England and Wales Scotland
Gap	between	DD	and	PP	prices	(£) Gap	between	DD	and	PP	prices	(£)
Electricity Gas Electricity & Gas Electricity Gas Electricity & Gas
2000 29 47 76 21 48 69
2001 27 43 70 21 45 66
2002 27 46 73 21 48 69
2003 26 44 70 21 44 65
2004 28 42 70 26 46 72
2005 36 48 84 23 53 76
2006 46 74 120 48 83 131
Source: BERR, Quarterly Energy Prices, June 2007
This shows that, at a time of generally rising fuel 
prices, customers on pre-payment meters have been 
burdened with even greater price rises than customers 
in general. This is despite the fact that the difference 
in cost to suppliers of servicing pre-payment meters 
compared to standard meters has not changed. 
The average figures though mask significant in 
performance between suppliers, as illustrated in the 
table 2.
6.3.4  What more could Ofgem do to protect the low income and vulnerable consumers?
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However, switching rates among pre-payment meter 
customers are lower than average due to a lack 
of awareness and limited availability of switching 
services (e.g. access to internet-based comparison 
services). Relying on competition may not be the 
most appropriate way of reducing energy costs for 
this group of consumers. Some customers may prefer 
to remain on pre-payment meters as standard credit 
or direct debit arrangements may not be suitable 
for their needs. Alternate methods of payment, 
including more flexible direct debit arrangements 
(e.g. weekly payment) and post-office deductions, 
could make cheap tariffs more accessible. 
Ofgem’s	supplier	switching	policy
Ofgem has consistently promoted switching energy 
suppliers to consumers as the most effective means 
of reducing overall energy bills. However research 
by the National Consumer Council both found that 
only around 20% of consumers actually seek out 
ways of reducing their energy bills,66 and over 50% 
of energy consumers have remained with their 
incumbent supplier since privatisation. The level 
of switching was stimulated by the rise in energy 
prices in 2006.67 
Ofgem’s sustainable development report highlights 
that switching between suppliers is at a lower level 
among consumers in lower income deciles, and 
some commentators have argued that this is partly 
as a result of limited access to internet based price 
comparators, which allow consumers to more easily 
compare tariffs and suppliers.
The lack of switching amongst lower income 
deciles means that many fuel poor and vulnerable 
households are not able to achieve any cost 
reductions that might be available through supplier 
switching. In addition, the lack of understandable 
information given to households relating to energy 
consumption is under-utilising this means of 
reducing household fuel bills. 
Energywatch noted in its super-complaint to 
Ofgem on the standard of billing (see above under 
Metering) that almost one in ten complainants 
believed that estimated billing had pushed them 
into debt with their supplier, and for a third of those, 
the debt exceeded £100. For one in four, the debt 
was difficult or impossible to pay off.66
Our conclusion from this evidence is that supplier 
switching is not a particularly helpful or appropriate 
method of reducing low-income household fuel bills 
and that more proactive steps need to be taken to 
protect low income and vulnerable consumers.
Recommendations
• Ofgem should mandate that pre-payment 
meters are smart meters capable of two way 
communication which would allow for tariffs 
changes to be adjusted instantaneously and 
could give consumers a better understanding 
of their energy use which could help reduce 
overall energy consumption and energy bills 
• Greater focus should be placed on a wider 
range of payment options, including using 
post-office deductions and fuel direct services 
as a means of paying outstanding fuel bills 
• Ofgem to require energy companies to 
provide energy tariffs for pre-payment meters 
that are not excessive in comparison to direct 
debit and standard credit tariffs 
• Ofgem’s Consumer First campaign has 
already revealed a level of concern amongst 
consumers on the amount of profit gained 
by energy supply companies. Ofgem should 
ensure that wholesale price changes are 
being passed on to all consumers, especially 
low income and vulnerable consumers. 
Conclusions
7
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In our view, the regulatory framework provided 
by Ofgem requires significant change, and our 
conclusion is that this can most effectively be 
achieved through a change to Ofgem’s primary duty. 
Changing the primary duty to stimulate Ofgem to 
integrate greenhouse gas emission reductions into its 
business would provide a clear and stable framework 
within which all energy generators, suppliers and 
network operators would operate. We believe such 
a change would secure greater consistency in the 
delivery of government energy policy, and would 
alleviate the tensions that exist between Ofgem’s 
current approach of strengthening competition, and 
government’s climate change goals. 
Our detailed recommendations on improvements to 
be made to the operation of the energy markets 
and networks, through the Price Control Reviews, 
align closely with our recommendation on the 
primary duty change. Similarly, we believe that 
our recommendations on the cultural and practical 
changes required within Ofgem as an institution, 
align closely to a change to the primary duty. Ofgem 
is a highly efficient institution for delivering against 
its existing goals, but these goals are not compatible 
with the scale of change that is required to meet 
government’s environmental goals. 
We recognise that Ofgem has made progress in 
supporting low income energy consumers, but we 
believe there is more that can be done. In particular 
we believe Ofgem should require energy companies 
to provide energy tariffs for pre-payment meters 
that are not excessive compared with the tariff for 
users on direct debit or standard credit. For all energy 
users information on how much energy is used, in 
an understandable format, is a basic requirement 
if we are to encourage people to engage with 
their energy use and reduce their demand. Current 
practices with metering and bill information do not 
support improved consumer information. Ofgem 
could make changes to tackle this. 
The next few years are critical for setting the UK on 
a path to a low carbon economy, and it will require 
changes in policy, regulation and practice. As the 
principal regulator of the energy system, Ofgem 
has a key role in ensuring that the UK’s energy 
sector makes the investment necessary to equip 
us with a system suitable for the challenges of the 
21st century. 
Our review of the role of Ofgem and its impact on achieving a sustainable energy system has revealed 
a	number	of	key	opportunities	for	government	to	achieve	a	significant	shift	 in	 its	efforts	to	reduce	
UK	carbon	emissions	through	electricity	and	heat	generation,	transmission,	distribution	and	use.	We	
believe the next few years are critical for ensuring the infrastructure is put into place to support 
progressive	decarbonisation	of	the	energy	system.	Without	investment,	such	infrastructure	will	not	be	
established,	and	without	the	right	regulatory	framework	such	investment	will	not	be	encouraged.	
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Appendix:  Implications for Scotland
Introduction
Regulation of the gas and electricity networks is 
a reserved power, so this Review has focused on 
the role of Ofgem and its relationship with the UK 
Government. However, in Scotland a number of 
devolved powers relate to energy, so the findings 
of this Review are likely to have significant impact 
on the Scottish Government’s delivery of its energy 
related functions. This Appendix provides more 
clarity on how our findings also relate to devolved 
powers in Scotland. 
Energy is a reserved matter, but the Scottish 
Parliament and Government have significant 
devolved powers relating to renewable energy, 
energy efficiency and climate change, and the 
way in which the energy market is regulated will 
therefore influence how Scotland delivers its energy 
policy goals. 
Over the previous two administrations, the Scottish 
Government has been very active in energy 
efficiency and renewable energy work, and with 
the new Government now in place this work will 
certainly continue and may increase in priority. 
Energy is a key issue for Scotland. The energy industry 
makes a significant contribution to the economy. 
The bulk of this has been in oil and gas, but the 
electricity market is also important and Scotland 
remains a net exporter of electricity. Scotland has 
also set more ambitious targets on renewable 
electricity generation than the UK as a whole. As is 
the case across the rest of the UK, climate change 
is an increasingly important focus of government 
policy and Scotland has significant long-standing 
fuel poverty problems. 
Devolution
Energy policy is a reserved matter, but importantly 
the Scottish Government has devolved powers65 on:
• promotion of renewable energy and energy 
efficiency
• consents for new electricity generating plant 
and transmission lines 
• planning and building regulations
• economic development
• environmental regulation 
• climate change
• fuel poverty 
• transport
• related research and development. 
Key issues for Scotland
Of particular relevance to Scotland are the following 
conclusions of our Review:
• The electricity trading arrangements (BETTA) 
penalise intermittent and small-scale energy 
generation 
• Capacity constraints are delaying the 
connection of renewable generation; this is 
particularly acute in the northern England/
Scotland area where the Beauly–Denny line 
has been awaiting planning permission 
for some time, and where decisions on 
undergrounding of transmission lines are 
particularly important 
• The Connection and Use of System Charging 
arrangements penalise generators located 
at points distant from the major sources of 
demand in the south east of England 
• Heat as a commodity is unregulated.  
We believe that it should be treated 
in parallel with electricity, so that the 
relationship between heat and power, the 
use of waste heat from industrial sources, 
and the drive to eliminate wasted heat from 
buildings, is integrated
• A more radical and systematic drive to 
improve efficiency in our use of heat in 
buildings, and to decarbonise the supply 
of heat, will be needed to ensure Scotland 
meets its carbon emission reduction goals in 
the medium and longer term.
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Decarbonising our economy
The Scottish Government has announced its intention 
to bring forward a Scottish Climate Change Bill setting 
targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80% 
by 2050. This challenging target will require major 
changes in the generation and use of energy. 
Our Review has concluded that Ofgem’s process for 
integrating carbon impacts into policy development 
is flawed. Ofgem systematically undervalues the 
social cost of carbon in its cost benefit analysis. 
We have recommended that Ofgem ‘aligns with 
government practice and revises its social cost of 
carbon, as used in cost benefit analysis’ and also that 
its primary duty is changed to give better alignment 
to government energy policy. This will also provide 
clearer alignment with Scottish Government policy 
on climate change and carbon related emissions. 
It is our view that these changes will ensure more 
coordinated delivery of energy policy and that the 
regulatory framework will therefore reflect the 
importance being placed on carbon reductions by 
government. 
Promotion	of	renewable	energy
Scotland has a significant renewables resource, 
and has been making a considerable contribution 
towards wider UK renewable targets. The UK target 
for renewable electricity is 10% by 2010. In contrast 
the Scottish target is 18%. The UK has set a 20% 
target for 2020, whereas the previous administration 
in Scotland set a 40% target for 2020.
The new Scottish Government has committed to 
developing an energy strategy for Scotland. Details 
of this have yet to emerge, but it is expected that the 
new government will retain targets at least as high 
as those of the previous administration. Relevant 
energy generation priorities set out in the Scottish 
National Party 2007 electoral manifesto were to:
• take forward proposals for a North Sea super-
grid
• continue investment in offshore renewables 
and look to extend available support.
Given our findings on capacity constraints and 
Connection and Use of System Charges that penalise 
more remote sources of generation, we would 
expect that our recommendations, if followed 
through, would assist the new Scottish Government 
in both these areas. Development of long distance 
grid networks would be expensive under the current 
framework, and offshore renewable resources will 
tend to connect in more peripheral locations where 
transmission charges are currently highest. 
Promotion	of	energy	efficiency
The Scottish Government has a wide range of 
initiatives designed to support an increase in energy 
efficiency in Scotland. In early 2007 it released a 
draft Energy Efficiency & Microgeneration Strategy 
for consultation. It is not yet clear how the new 
government will take forward action on energy 
efficiency and microgeneration. However, it is clear 
that Scotland has a significant problem with energy 
inefficiency and fuel poverty. 
The new Administration made a number of relevant 
commitments in its 2007 election manifesto, 
including to:
• Convene an expert group to make 
recommendations on changes to building 
regulations to increase energy efficiency and 
encourage more local energy production
• Consult on the introduction of a planning 
presumption requiring all new buildings 
in Scotland to include sufficient renewable 
generation on-site to deliver between 20% 
and 50% of energy needs
• Consult on setting a new guideline for energy 
saving in new buildings with the aim of 
reducing their energy footprint by between 
20% and 33%.
Our Review has highlighted that Ofgem has 
successfully delivered energy efficiency programmes 
for government, but could do more to support 
provision of accurate billing that would help keep 
consumers better informed of their household 
energy use.
Our conclusion that Ofgem should regulate not only 
gas and electricity but also the wider heat market 
would support any move in Scotland towards 
decentralised energy. One way to deliver increased 
efficiency in our system would be to support 
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combined heat and power systems, both at the 
large and small scale. Combined heat and power 
is particularly suited to more localised forms of 
generation so could play a major role in delivering 
on-site energy solutions. 
Conclusions
Energy is an important policy area for Scotland, 
and the findings of our Review are likely to have 
a significant impact on the Scottish Government’s 
delivery of its energy policy goals and any emerging 
Strategy, for both generation and efficiency. 
Scotland’s generation and supply businesses have 
been subject to significant changes over the last 
few years due to the introduction of BETTA. It is 
clear that if Scotland is to press on with the delivery 
of carbon reductions in its energy system then the 
regulatory regime needs to be reformed, so that 
carbon considerations play a larger role in regulatory 
decisions, and clearer signals are sent to industry 
and consumers. While regulation is currently a 
reserved matter, changes in Ofgem’s duties and in 
how it takes its work forward will be important for 
Scotland’s energy policy and energy sector.
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